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  ABSTRACT	  
 
The moral permissibility of suicide continues to be as controversial as ever. Recent, rapid 
advances in medicine and science, and in particular in those technologies that extend human 
life, have resulted in a resurgence of interest in the question. In this paper, I examine two 
views on suicide so as to arrive at an answer to the question of whether suicide is ever 
morally permissible. I look in some detail at a sanctity-of-life approach, in which it is argued 
that suicide is against ‘natural’ law and that it perverts our rational desire for the good that is 
life. By way of contrast, I examine a broadly utilitarian approach to the question. I conclude 
that it is through the application of the utilitarian approach that we are able to come to the 
answer that sometimes, depending on the circumstances, suicide may in fact be morally 
permissible, not only for reasons of suffering or ill health such as we expect to find in the 
context of euthanasia.   
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   1. INTRODUCTION	  
 
In his 2011 book, Suicide: The Philosophical Dimensions, Michael Cholbi notes an increased 
resurgence in “philosophical and public policy” agendas relating to euthanasia, possibly due 
to advances in medical care and an increased awareness of the issues (2011: 11). At the heart 
of this discussion in contemporary society is the question of our views on suicide and its 
ethical permissibility. Despite its long and often intense history, the ethical status of suicide 
remains complex, suited to continued analysis. In South Africa, as in much of the world, 
many seek actively to prevent suicide and to assist those contemplating it to avoid it, and the 
desire to end one’s own life continues to be associated with mental illness, general 
irrationality, or a severe depressive state.  
 
In addition, at least some of the traditional western Judaeo-Christian values that underpin 
overtly theological prohibitions of suicide seem still to inform other more philosophical 
approaches to the question of the morality of suicide. As J. David Velleman points out, “most 
moral discourse has religious sources” (1999: 615) and suicide continues to elicit strong 
responses from many quarters. Suicide remains controversial and central to a set of 
“conceptual, moral, and psychological” considerations relating to the meaning of life and 
death (Cholbi 2012: 1). 
 
This paper examines two possible responses to the question of whether suicide can ever be 
morally permissible: sanctity-of-life and utilitarian views. The focus in the paper is on 
traditional, western views, which tend to be generally prohibitive of suicide.  In this paper, I 
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argue that it is through the application of a utilitarian view that we are able to come to the 
answer that sometimes, depending on the circumstances, suicide may be morally permissible.  
 
Philosophers have been writing about suicide for centuries, aptly summarised by Cholbi 
(2012). From a survey of the literature available, it is clear that while some find suicide 
morally permissible, many have found and continue to find it impermissible. Albert Camus 
and Jean Paul Sartre, for example, view suicide as “an assertion of authentic human will in 
the face of absurdity” (Cholbi 2012: 16, 17). Others, writing firmly from a traditional, 
Christian viewpoint see suicide as an unrepentable sin. Few, like Schopenhauer, “find 
nothing in principle objectionable to suicide,” and such objections as he may have had are 
“metaphysical rather than moral” (Jacquette 2000: 48).  A number of utilitarian thinkers view 
suicide, after Hume, as “free of imputation of guilt and blame” (Cholbi 2012: 15). In line 
with Jeremy Bentham’s view, that suicide may be permissible if it maximises utility and 
minimises disutility, these utilitarian thinkers see the moral permissibility of suicide as 
variable, depending on its utilitarian value or disvalue (Cholbi 2012: 15).  
 
It is, however, already quite commonly accepted that suicide for the purposes of euthanasia 
may be morally excusable, even if not morally permissible. In the United States, for example, 
the American Medical Association (AMA) allows that a patient be permitted to die (through 
the discontinuation of treatment, for example, but a doctor may not “take any direct action 
designed to kill the patient” (Rachels 1975: 78). For James Rachels, this acceptance of 
passive euthanasia has led to the odd situation in which ‘letting die’ may be less morally 
defensible than assisting someone to die would be (Rachels 1975: 79).1 In this essay, I will 
argue that it is possible to assert that suicide is morally permissible, and that we need not only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I	  return	  to	  Rachels’	  argument	  later	  in	  this	  paper.	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have this view in cases in which death is the only alternative to extreme suffering or ill 
health.  
 
As has been indicated above, Western views on suicide have tended generally to be negative, 
despite the fact that it is no longer considered a legally punishable act of ‘self-murder’.2 As 
Richard Brandt points out, there appears to be two broad positions adopted by those who 
argue that suicide is morally impermissible. On the one hand, there are those who hold that 
“every act of suicide is wrong, everything considered”; and, on the other hand, there are more 
nuanced views which appear to assert that “there is always some moral obligation … not to 
commit suicide” but that this obligation need not preclude there being “countervailing 
considerations which in particular situations make it right or even a moral duty” (Brandt 
1992: 318, emphasis in the original).  In the context of this broad distinction, this paper looks 
in some detail at an approach to suicide that fits into Brandt’s first category.  
 
The first approach canvassed, exemplified by the work of Craig Paterson (2003a, 2003b, 
2008) argues that suicide is against ‘natural’ law and perverts the sanctity-of-life. I look then 
at a consequentialist, utilitarian view by way of contrast and in line with Brandt’s second 
category.  I avoid, however, any argument, regardless of source, that asserts at base that 
suicide is always and ever a manifestation or irrationality or mental illness, or that adopts a 
religious approach to the question of its moral permissibility. I examine in the essay how each 
approach answers the question of whether suicide is ever morally permissible and argue that, 
for reasons to be explicated below, the utilitarian view in Brandt’s latter category is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Yet other views, predominantly from Eastern cultures, are accepting or approving of suicide. For example, 
Confucian philosophy allows for suicide to be either a good death or a bad death depending on the intention and 
reasons (Ping-Cheung, 2010: 74; Young, 2002). According to Zen philosophy, suicide is neither good nor bad, it 
is just death (Lester, 2006:526).	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preferable.  
 2. DEFINITIONS	  OF	  SUICIDE	  
 
Defining suicide is a contested area that more often than not reveals the differences in the 
moral standpoints adopted by the writer doing the defining. For the purposes of this essay, I 
cannot simply assume that any definitional inclusions or exclusions I intuitively make will be 
shared by the reader, or that reader’s by me. As many have shown, even the ‘common sense’ 
or ordinary language meanings, such as those found in dictionaries, are not sufficient for our 
purpose.3  Michael Cholbi sums the issue up thus: “views about the nature of suicide often 
incorporate, sometimes unknowingly, views about the prudential or moral justifiability of 
suicide and are therefore not value-neutral descriptions of suicide” (Cholbi 2011: 2). 
Although Cholbi’s discussion focuses more on our understanding of suicidal behaviours – 
which may or may not result in the actual death – than on the act of suicide, it raises 
interesting considerations. As Cholbi points out, there are self-initiated deaths that could be 
said not to be suicide – mistakenly swallowing a poison in the belief that it is lemonade, for 
example (Cholbi 2012: 3).  
 
In simple terms, and for the purposes of this report, a suicide results when the self-killing 
intends the resulting death. Thus the above example offered by Cholbi is not a suicide 
because, although a self-killing, the death that results is based on a mistake: the drinking of 
the ‘lemonade’ was never intended to cause death. Romeo’s death, on the other hand, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   See	   Craig	   Paterson	   (2003a),	   Michael	   Cholbi	   (2012)	   and	   Richard	   Brandt	   (1992),	   for	   discussions	   of	   the	  
difficulties	  of	  defining	  ‘suicide’.	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clearly a suicide. His drinking of the poison was no mistake – he intended to drink it and he 
intended consequently to die. His death was thus a suicide, despite the fact that he intended to 
die as a result of his mistaken belief that Juliet is dead.4 As Cholbi points out, in suicide there 
is a “non-accidental relationship between suicidal behaviour and death” and the self-inflicted 
death (or its attempt) reflects an intentional choice to die (2012: 3). Given the level and 
intensity of the debate, there seems still to be a “great willingness” in the writings on suicide 
to “categorize self-killings intended to avoid one’s just deserts as suicides” (as for example, 
in the case of Hitler), rather than “self-killings intended to benefit others” (as in the case of 
Socrates or Jesus, for example) (Cholbi 2012: 2-3). Thus the debate about whether ‘suicide 
bombers’ or religious martyrs are to be considered suicides at all continues unabated (Frey 
1981: 193-202). 
 
Daniel Hill’s definition leaves aside the purpose or alternate consequences of the suicide that 
are possible, and focuses on the relationship between the death, and the goal to be achieved 
by the death thus: 
A commits suicide by performing an act x if and only if A intends that he or she 
kill himself or herself by performing x (under the description ‘I kill myself'), and 
this intention is fully satisfied (Hill 2011: 192). 
 
Likewise, Brandt argues that a sound definition of suicide must contain both the potential for 
its permissibility and impermissibility. Brandt asserts that we need a characterisation of 
suicide that does not render it implicitly immoral and that thus allows us to “make all the 
evaluations anyone might wish to make” (1992: 315). For Brandt, whatever definition we use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Romeo	  and	  Juliet,	  Act	  V,	  scene	  iii,	  lines	  130-­‐1.	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should be “neutral” enough to permit for a consideration of whether a particular suicide is 
“rational, morally justifiable, and so on” (1992:315). Brandt thus defines suicide as:  
doing something which results in one’s death, either from the intention of ending 
one’s life or the intention to bring about some other state of affairs (such as relief 
from pain) which one thinks it certain or highly probably can be achieved only by 
means of death (1992: 315). 
Brandt’s definition removes the presumption of moral blameworthiness from the definition 
by including in its scope those suicides that “are not sinful or blameworthy” (Brandt 1992: 
317).  
 
Craig Paterson rejects Brandt’s definition of suicide for a number of reasons. Key among 
these is that, for Paterson, a definition of suicide requires more than the “mere knowledge” 
that the action A is taking may result in A’s death (Paterson 2003a: 354). Thus, for example, 
if A intends to alleviate her suffering by taking a certain amount of morphine, she does not 
intend to end her life even though she thinks that “it [is] certain or highly probabl[e]” that the 
result can “be achieved only by means of death” (Brandt 1992: 315). On Brandt’s definition, 
A has committed suicide. In Paterson’s view, however, A has not done so. Paterson rejects 
Brandt’s definition of suicide on the grounds that the “action’s consequence can be certainly 
known, yet not be intended” as he wishes to avoid the distinction between intention and 
foresight thus preventing the application of the doctrine of double effect (Paterson 2003a: 
354). Applying the doctrine of double effect to A’s case above would mean that “the 
permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being” 
would be morally permissible if it has, as a side effect, the promotion of a good result, such 
as that person’s release from suffering (McIntyre 2014:1).  For Paterson, Brandt’s definition 
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is not acceptable as it inappropriately brings an action such as A’s “intentional behaviour […] 
under the act-description of suicide” (Paterson 2003a: 354).  
 
Paterson’s definition clearly delineates ‘suicide’ as a category of acts in which the person’s 
own death is the intended outcome. For Paterson therefore,  
[suicide is] an act or omission whose proximate effect results in the person’s own 
bodily death, voluntarily and knowingly undertaken, with the intended objective 
(whether as an end in itself or as a means to some further end) that one’s bodily 
life be so terminated (Paterson 2003a, 354-5). 
The definition contains the deontological premise (although not explicitly) from which 
Paterson’s argument will proceed: what is defined as suicide will be found wanting precisely 
because the intention is to end the bodily existence of the person committing the act.  
 
Brandt’s definition is thus broader than Paterson’s and does not examine the consequence or 
reason for the suicide; Paterson’s definition conversely focuses on the purpose of the 
commission of the act. Paterson thus excludes from the category of suicide those cases in 
which he feels there is a moral justification for the taking of one’s own life, such that the 
consequences (my death) may be known (I will die if I throw myself on that grenade), and yet 
not intended (so as to save the lives of my comrades). Brandt, on the other hand, would not 
necessarily exclude all such instances of self-killing from the category of suicide, as 
demonstrated above with the example of A. 
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Furthermore, Paterson is clear that he does not want a definition that permits for a “coercion 
exception clause” to be included in its terms as the “question of an agent’s degree of 
culpability should be regarded as a second-order question” (Paterson 2003a: 354). He offers 
us Tom L. Beauchamp’s definition of suicide thus: “an act is a suicide if a person brings 
about his or her own death in circumstances where others do not coerce him or her into 
action” (in Paterson 2003a: 354). Paterson does not agree with Beauchamp, and wants to 
remove the possibility of circumstances that could be seen as coercing a particular result 
(suicide) and could consequently lead to us “exonerating” the suicide (2003a: 354). For 
example, Paterson does not agree with Beauchamp that there could be degrees of pain and 
suffering that may mitigate the blameworthiness of death. For Paterson, suicide is wrong and 
no factors of ‘coercion’ or ‘force’ alter this. Where there are concerns of sufficient force that 
they override the prohibition against suicide, (for example, a man who kills himself to save 
his family), the fact that the suicide is aimed at saving his family means that it is not a 
suicide. To wit Paterson states: 
it is also a valid concern for the competent to altruistically assess what the 
burdens of treatment and care might entail for others. It is not unreasonable for 
persons to determine that they may not wish to place their families in the position 
of carrying the extended emotional and financial burden of treating and caring for 
them … Such altruism is, I think, permissible as a form of self-sacrifice, for the 
intention need only be to avoid the burdens associated with treatment and care, 
not the deliberate hastening of death (2008: 198, emphasis added)  
While Brandt would see this as an instance of suicide, Hill would probably not, and Paterson 
expressly renders it an instance of self-sacrifice. It is clear, therefore, that how we define 
“suicide” at the outset is tied up with our consequent evaluation of its wrongfulness. Thus the 
question of what constitutes suicide is open to much debate, but is not a focus of this paper. 
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In this paper I focus on those deaths Paterson and I would most likely agree to characterise as 
suicide.  
 3. TWO	  APPROACHES	  TO	  SUICIDE	  
 
 
There are many varied responses to the question of the moral permissibility of suicide. 
Michael Cholbi outlines the key categories into which secular arguments regarding the 
permissibility of suicide fit (2011): there are those who argue against suicide from the broad 
perspective of natural law, and the value or sanctity-of-life (2011: 54), those who oppose 
suicide from the point of view that one’s life is owed to others as a social good (2011: 58), 
and those who argue the related point that one has a debt of reciprocity to society (2011: 60). 
Additional arguments against suicide come from the point of view of ‘role responsibilities,’ 
in which suicide prevents us from fulfilling our moral obligations to others and, in fact, 
causes harm to those around us (Cholbi 2011: 62). And there are broadly Kantian arguments 
that largely view suicide as a denial of human autonomy (Cholbi 2011). Yet others argue that 
our emotional responses to suicide are not to be ignored. Christopher Cowley disagrees with 
Brandt that some suicides may not be ‘irrational’ and may also be morally permissible 
(2006). Cowley wants us to focus on what he calls the three key elements of suicide: the 
horror, pity and mystery of suicide (2006: 496). For Cowley, our feelings on hearing of a 
suicide are more instructive on questions of the permissibility of suicide than are the answers 
to the question of whether a suicide is rational or irrational in its context (Cowley 2006: 496).  
 
Often conversations around suicide, particularly in the context of voluntary active euthanasia, 
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centre on the notion of the patient’s5 rights. While this is an approach worth mentioning, it 
does not form part of the detail of this paper. Rights-based views, on the whole, tend to see 
suicide as morally permissible. People are seen to possess certain rights, among these being 
the right to determine their own fates. Usually, this right flows from other rights seen as 
inalienable human rights. Rights-based arguments differ however, on the question of 
precisely which human right is the source of the so-called right to die. It must be mentioned 
at this point, that there are two difficulties canvassing rights-based arguments about suicide.  
The first is that they are so often tied up with jurisprudential discussions relating to the legal 
and constitutional rights at issue. The second is that they focus predominantly on euthanasia 
in quite specific terms, rather than on suicide in general terms. Nonetheless, I outline briefly 
below the kinds of high-level considerations of the rights-based approach to suicide by way 
of contrast to that of Paterson and the utilitarian which follow.    
 
Libertarian rights-based thinkers “assert[…] that the right to suicide is a right of 
noninterference, to wit, that others are morally barred from interfering with suicidal 
behaviour” (Cholbi 2012: 22). On the basis of this right, we have the right to “decide those 
matters that are most intimately connected to our well-being, including the duration of our 
lives and the circumstances of our deaths” (Cholbi 2012: 23).  Others have argued that the 
right to terminate one’s life is a liberty right, whether alone or in combination with the right 
to privacy. We have the freedom to commit suicide, and no duty to not commit suicide as it 
“violates no other moral obligations” (Cholbi 2012: 22-3). In “The Philosophers’ Brief”6 
(Ronald Dworkin et al 1997) the amici focus on a number of legal rights issues pertaining to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  “Patient”	  is	  used,	  given	  the	  medical	  context	  of	  euthanasia.	  Of	  course,	  the	  notion	  of	  rights	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
‘right	  to	  die’	  need	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  euthanasia.	  	  
6	  This	  document	  was	  prepared	  by	  philosophers	  Ronald	  Dworkin,	  Thomas	  Nagel,	  Robert	  Nozick,	  John	  Rawls	  and	  
Judith	  Jarvis	  Thomson,	  among	  others	  as	  part	  of	  the	  brief	  filed	  in	  their	  capacity	  as	  amicus	  curiae	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
cases	  before	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court.	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the status of assisted suicide. The amici state clearly at the outset that their position is based 
on the right to liberty enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States (1997: 5) and argue that “a person’s interest in following his own conviction at 
the end of life is so central a part of the more general right to make ‘intimate and personal 
choices’ for himself that a failure to protect that particular interest would undermine the 
general right altogether” (1997: 5). As Yale Kamisar points out, this view has been adopted 
by the United States courts when concluding that the manner and time of one’s own death is a 
constitutionally-protected right (1996: 482). Finally, an argument for the permissibility of 
suicide may proceed from the premise that we have the right to autonomy, flowing from 
which is the subordinate right to self-determination. In this sense, the meaning of autonomy is 
distinct from the Kantian notion and is rather one in which having choices and the “means 
with which to implement them” are viewed as “goods” (Velleman 1992: 667).  
 
It is clear that there is no single rights-based argument, and that it is important in these 
discussions to differentiate the legal and philosophical strands in the works canvassed. In 
general, however, arguments from rights acknowledge that suicide is a special case, as 
“[m]ost people in normal circumstances do have a duty not to kill themselves that is derived 
from the rights of other people who rely or depend on them” (Feinberg 1978:119). There are, 
of course, difficulties with rights-based view of suicide, including, but not limited to those 
raised by Cholbi. First, considering the right to die as a right does not always mean that we 
have examined the other moral obligations this may violate, including our obligations to other 
people (2012: 22). Secondly, given that the notion of self-ownership is fundamental to some 
such rights-based views, particularly libertarian views, and that this notion is not 
unambiguously agreed upon, it impacts on our understanding of the exercise of rights in 
respect of one’s ‘self’. Self-ownership is not as clear as it may at first appear. We are not 
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simply distinct from our bodies and cannot ‘own’ and dispose of them in quite the same way 
as we own other objects (Cholbi 2012: 23). Thirdly, if we use the right to self-determination 
then this appears to imply that we have the right to determine the course and length of our 
own lives. Such a right is viewed as the natural corollary to a right to life.  
 
Although beyond the bounds of the discussion in this paper, it is clear that there are 
limitations on each of the different kinds of rights-based approaches, in part because of which 
right is seen as fundamental. Also, as the kinds of rights that form the focus of a discussion 
on suicide are individual rights, and inhere in persons as individuals, there is no clear 
mechanism through which to address the nature of potentially competing rights in the context 
of the morality of suicide. Although there are clearly several prima facie difficulties with a 
rights-based approach, whether based on an inverse right to life, the right to non-interference, 
the right to dignity, or the right to autonomy, it is clear also that there are grounds here from 
which the moral permissibility of the decision to terminate one’s life may be considered. 
Such a discussion is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  	  
 
From the brief outline above, we go into some detail on two key approaches. These are the 
sanctity-of-life (natural law) arguments and broadly utilitarian arguments. Expressly excluded 
from the discussion are the theological, psychiatric and medico-legal approaches to suicide. 
What I hope to argue through an examination of the sanctity-of-life and utilitarian approaches 
is that the latter is able to address many of our natural intuitions regarding the social and 
ethical aspects of suicide, and all come to an answer about the moral (im)permissibility of 
suicide. I would like to put forward an argument for why suicide is sometimes permissible. In 
the discussion of the sanctity-of-life approach to suicide, I will focus on one author, Craig 
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Paterson, as broadly representative of a contemporary sanctity-of-life approach to the 
question of suicide. Clearly, however, what refers to Paterson’s views may not apply equally 
to all sanctity-of-life views, and the focus is, rather, on his view as indicative of the broad 
features of this kind of approach. My discussion of Paterson’s arguments will form the basis 
for an examination of utilitarianism.  
 
3.1. A SANCTITY-OF-LIFE VIEW ON SUICIDE 
 
As a starting point into the question of whether suicide is ever morally permissible, it is worth 
taking a look in some detail at a view that argues that it is never permissible. One such 
approach is offered to us by deontological, sanctity-of-life thinkers. Broadly speaking, a 
sanctity-of-life or natural law view asserts that killing is wrong because all human life is 
inherently sacred and is thus, regardless of its form or status, always valuable in itself. The 
argument applies equally to abortion, euthanasia and suicide, for example. Although 
traditionally sanctity-of-life views have derived from predominantly religious perspectives in 
which religious precepts dictate, roughly, that life is god-given and may only be taken away 
by the same god, sanctity-of-life views are not restricted to the religious. There are sanctity-
of-life approaches that are strongly held and argued by secular theorists (Cholbi 2012: 18; 
Cholbi 2011: 54). A vigorous proponent of such a secular sanctity-of-life argument is Craig 
Paterson. He argues that his opposition to voluntary active euthanasia (and hence to suicide) 
derives from a “secular natural law ethics perspective” (2008: 13, emphasis in original) 
which does not overtly or impliedly trade on “revealed theological doctrine” (2008: 14). Thus 
whether the source of the sanctity of human life is seen as divine or not, the sanctity-of-life 
view approaches suicide as an act that violates our moral duty to honour the inherent value of 
14	  
	  
human life, regardless of the “value [ … ] that life has to others or to the person whose life it 
is" (Cholbi 2012: 18). Paterson argues that the key element of his natural law approach to the 
question of suicide in all it manifestations is that it must concern itself with “how rational 
human beings ought to act” while addressing a person’s ability to deliberate and to choose 
(2008: 14). It is worth elucidating some of the strands in Paterson’s thinking underlying this 
assertion, fundamental as they are to his thinking.  
 
Paterson proposes a secular, “objectivist” view to the moral permissibility of suicide (as 
euthanasia), grounded in human reason and not based on “appeals to any form of knowledge 
other than natural human knowledge” (2008: 15). He argues that his view is consequently 
“trans-historical as well as trans-cultural” (2008:16) and evidences these universalities 
because all humans are intrinsically in possession of practical rationality as human beings, 
regardless of cultural, legal or other differences. In Paterson’s view, human beings evince 
practical rationality and, consequently, always seek the good and avoid the evil. Paterson 
differentiates his secular, sanctity-of-life view from what he characterises as “naïve vitalism” 
(2003b: 13; 2008: 119); a view he rejects. Vitalism holds that “human life is an absolute 
moral value and that it is wrong either to shorten the life of an individual human being or to 
fail to lengthen it” (Keown 1998: 256). Although Paterson says his views on life as a primary 
good are different to those of vitalism, it is not very clear on exactly what basis he argues 
this, as may become evident later.  
 
The goods to which practical rationality lead are “primary goods” which are the “ultimate 
reasons” humans have to act (Paterson 2008: 90). Paterson is convinced that we may not 
select from among these primary goods, nor may they be ranked or separated into constituent 
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parts. Each primary good is “irreducible, non-derivative and incommensurably diverse” 
(Paterson 2008: 90). Each good makes and generates its own unique requirements that govern 
the ways in which we act. Primary goods, he continues, can never be treated as secondary 
goods, nor can primary goods ever be “downgraded” to secondary goods as a result of 
subjective attitude or opinion. Under no circumstances may primary goods ever be treated as 
though they were “means-end instrumentalities” (Paterson 2008:91). Because practically 
rational humans actively seek primary goods, these goods are immutable, objective, moral 
statements of what ‘ought to be’. The application of these principles for Paterson means that 
they are true, no matter what we may think. He uses the example of slavery to illustrate his 
point. Once an accepted social institution, slavery is nonetheless objectively wrong and, 
perhaps more importantly, was objectively morally wrong even when socially accepted. 
Likewise, he asserts, the contemporary social acceptance of euthanasia in the Netherlands 
“may still be radically at odds with objectively discernible moral standards” (Paterson 
2008:16).  
 
In stark contrast to the primary goods humans seek, are those evils we actively avoid. For 
Paterson, suicide is morally impermissible because it is “death per se that is really the 
objective evil for us” as it “ontologically destroys the current existent subject” (Paterson 
2003b: 19). Paterson asserts “human life is an intelligible good whose goodness is not 
deduced or derived from the goodness of other goods and whose goodness is not reducible to 
any other good” (Paterson 2008: 84). For this reason, “human life qua human life is an 
intrinsic good for all persons” (Paterson 2008: 84). Practical rationality prohibits us from 
treating human life as though it were a “non-intrinsic good” and to do so would constitute an 
unreasonable wrong (Paterson 2008: 84). Death is simply never preferable to life. Suicide is 
wrong because “[t]o deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not 
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seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility” 
(Paterson 2003b: 19-20). The agent of death – whether the self or another – is thus making a 
morally impermissible choice in choosing death over life, as such a choice “directs our 
actions in a less than fully reasonable way” (Paterson 2008: 84-5).  
 
Aside from the fact that human life is an objective good, Paterson is also of the view that all 
suicide is classifiable as a homicide. In his words, “the killing of a person is surely entailed” 
by suicide and it makes no difference to the definition whether the person was “self-
executed” or whether the homicide was carried out by another (Paterson 2008: 115).  For this 
reason, suicide, assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia are all, in Paterson’s view, equally 
instances of ‘homicide’ and are thus equally subject to the “scope of a concrete moral 
absolute prohibiting the intentional killing of an innocent person, regardless of any further 
appeal to end of consequences” (Paterson 2008: 115). The moral case for the permissibility of 
suicide cannot be sustained by the argument that a person suffering or in pain would be 
‘better off dead’, as such a conclusion is unreasonable (Paterson 2008: 115-116). For 
Paterson, suicide, assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia are thus impermissible.  
 
Despite this conclusion, he nonetheless argues that passive euthanasia may be permissible 
where “it is indeed licit to withhold or withdraw life-preserving treatment” (Paterson 2003b: 
13). It is not clear on what basis he deviates from his own characterisation of death as the 
ultimate evil, and how, given that we are not permitted to rank or select from primary goods, 
this particular death brought about by inaction is permissible. Nor is it clear why this death is 
not considered homicide. If it is not considered, it is unclear why not. Paterson attempts to 
pre-empt these concerns thus: “there need be no essential incompatibility between, on the one 
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hand, placing severe restraints on interference with the persistent choice of patients, even 
though they are intentionally suicidal, and yet, on the other, still uphold[ing] the respect due 
to the good of human life” (2003b: 14). He argues that there may be several reasons for why 
we should not interfere with a persistent wish to die. Included among these reasons are that 
successful treatment requires the participation of the patient, that the morale of the patient 
and his or her family would be negatively affected, perhaps even resulting in trauma. Even 
more important, Paterson argues,  
the imposition of such an overt act of countermanding a patient’s decision, would 
serve only to undermine the already tested reputation of the medical profession, 
suspicions of paternalistic interventions by physicians, and with it, a concomitant 
perception of disregard for the dignity of the individual patient. (Paterson 2003b: 
14) 
Paterson argues that this deviation from his own principled approach to suicide does not 
“amount to a policy of condoning the aiding and abetting of a suicide” (2003b: 14). 
Rather, he argues, “it presents a principled decision to intentionally act for a good 
objective, the common good of patients, and the community generally” (2003b: 14). 
Notwithstanding Paterson’s attempts to differentiate these from other cases, it is still 
unclear why the moral status of the death in the case of the person who elects passive 
euthanasia and the moral status of the death in the case of the person who elects 
voluntary active euthanasia are different. It makes little sense to base a distinction on 
either the dignity and sense of freedom of choice of the patient in the context of a 
sanctity-of-life argument or, more bewilderingly, on the reputation and perception of 
the medical profession.  
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Nonetheless, leaving that distinction aside for the moment7 it is against this broad backdrop 
that Paterson believes that his argument against the moral permissibility of suicide will 
overcome the arguments from opponents to the sanctity-of-life approach. Paterson 
characterises opponents to his view as proposing a counter view that rests on a false duality; 
one that insists on the separation of biological life from the “higher order functions or 
properties of personal life” (Paterson 2003b: 2). It is the latter quality of personal life which 
is thought to constitute a desired quality of life if present, and a lower or lack of quality of life 
if absent.  Paterson argues that utilitarian thinkers such as Peter Singer and James Rachels 
have changed our understanding of ‘quality of life’ to distinguish between “being alive” and 
“having a life” in which the former (biological) life has less meaning or value than the latter 
(higher order, personal life) (Paterson 2003b: 3). Paterson argues that this duality is 
unacceptable and that the ranking of one as more important than the other means that quality 
of life proponents have to use a variety of “threshold sufficiency criteria” to determine 
whether or not a life is one “worthy of protection” (Paterson 2003b: 5). It is not entirely clear, 
though, how this is substantively different from the approach to passive euthanasia Paterson 
allows for above.  
 
Paterson argues against ‘quality-of-life’ opponents to sanctity-of-life asserting that, at base, a 
quality of life view is premised on someone who, having not reached the threshold test, is no 
longer considered a ‘person’. In Paterson’s view, there can be no such category of thing as 
“human non-person” in contrast to a “human person” such that only the latter’s life can be 
said to have value (Paterson 2003b; 7).8 In keeping with the fact, then, that life is a primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  We	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  active	  versus	  passive	  euthanasia	  and	  their	  respective	  moral	  statuses	  in	  the	  final	  
section	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
8	  I	  think,	  incidentally,	  that	  Paterson	  is	  correct	  in	  this	  –	  surely	  one	  does	  not	  become	  a	  non-­‐person	  by	  virtue	  of	  
changes	  wrought	  by	  illness,	  or	  insanity,	  or	  even	  arguably	  imprisonment.	  I	  examine	  Paterson’s	  arguments	  here	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good, and that humans in possession of practical rationality seek out this primary good, 
Paterson asserts that all human life has value, regardless of whether individual members of 
the human species are not rational, or do not have quality of life, and so on. He refers to 
Aristotle’s view that we are “by nature ‘rational animals’” as “defining the essential universal 
nature of the species” (Paterson 2003b: 9). Thus all humans must be offered the “rightful 
protection offered to the archetypal members of our species because of what they essentially 
are irrespective of the particular circumstances of any given member” (Paterson 2003b: 10, 
emphasis in the original).  
 
In a number of places, Paterson asserts that any concern with or focus on quality of life 
considerations in itself negates or undermines sanctity-of-life considerations. If we accept 
that in a quality-of-life evaluation the focus is on “assessing … the worthwhileness of the 
patient's life” (Keown 1998: 260) then, consequently, the view may be taken that certain lives 
may “fall below a quality threshold, whether because of disease, injury, or disability” (Keown 
1998: 260). It is still not clear, however, that a below-threshold life is necessarily a worthless 
life; simply that it is a life less than the worthwhile ideal. Singer adds to the quality of life 
considerations the caveat that not all questions of quality of life and of whether it is moral to 
commit suicide or not in the context of life’s quality relate to issues of illness or suffering. 
They may equally relate to issues of boredom, or tiredness (Singer 2003: 535). For the person 
tired of or deriving no meaning from life, the quality of that life may indeed be poor enough 
to warrant wanting an end without in any way impacting the ‘sanctity’ of that life. It seems to 
me that these two views are not necessarily as dualistic as Paterson assumes them to be. 
Broadly speaking, quality of life considerations include questions relating to the “welfare and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for	  what	  they	  elucidate	  about	  his	  own	  views,	  rather	  than	  for	  their	  value	  as	  critique	  of	  quality	  of	  life	  views.	  It	  
can	  be	  argued,	  for	  example,	  that	  what	  Paterson	  attributes	  to	  quality-­‐of-­‐life	  thinkers	  is	  not	  actually	  what	  they	  
attribute	  to	  themselves.	  The	  minutiae	  of	  this	  counter	  argument	  is,	  however,	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	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wishes of the patient” (Jewell 2005: 1), as well as respect for the autonomy, suffering and 
choices of rational beings relating to their lives as they live them (see Jewell 2005: 3 and 
Singer 2003, for example).  Thus despite having himself had some concern with these kinds 
of issues in the case of passive euthanasia, Paterson roundly rejects such considerations in 
general, stating that as life is a primary good, it is simply not possible to say that any person 
can be said to have a life “worth not living” (Paterson 2003b).  
 
Paterson’s characterisation of the value-of-life and sanctity-of-life approaches as 
diametrically opposed and competing approaches is worth quoting in full: 
Thus, there are effectively two primary categories of human life to be identified: 
‘personal life’ manifesting feature(s) X … Z, and ‘non-personal life’ that is 
incapable of manifesting feature(s) X … Z. Human life is valued as long as it is 
capable of instantiating the feature(s) sufficient to constitute personal life. Mere 
non-personal life (not worth living and thus not worthy of full protection from 
intentional killing) is thus heavily contrasted with personal life (worth living and 
thus alone worthy of full protection from intentional killing). Jonathan Glover, 
James Rachels, Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse and John Harris all subscribe to the 
notion that what is truly valued is not human life as such but personal life, life 
that is capable of manifesting the sufficient feature(s) X . . . Z — rationality, self-
awareness, consciousness, etc., or some composite thereof. (Paterson 2003b: 5) 
 
Paterson’s view is that we ought never to be able to argue that some lives are not worth 
living: “there is quite simply no critical threshold that can be crossed, such that a 
diminishment in flourishing ceases to instantiate any inherent good genuinely worth 
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preserving” (Paterson 2003b: 11). It follows then that in Paterson’s view, any argument in 
which the sanctity-of-life is not preserved in its absolute form results in approaches that assert 
at base that “[w]hen human life itself fails to live up to our expected requirements, it can 
ultimately be dispensed with” (2003b:5). Paterson argues that views in which life is seen as 
an instrumental good and not as a self-evident human good, result in the rejection of the 
sanctity of life itself. For Paterson, “any rejection of human life itself cannot be warranted 
since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject” and results in the destruction 
of the person (Paterson 2003b: 19).  
 
In my view, Paterson’s dismissal of quality of life concerns is largely unsatisfactory. It cannot 
simply be that, because one may not value a certain kind of life or living, it can be concluded 
that one does not value ‘life’ at all, or all life, nor is this what quality-of-life proponents 
appear to be arguing. In Singer’s view, surely it is more than simple brain function that we 
ought to value. Rather, he argues, “what we care about – and really ought to care about – is 
the person not the body” (Singer 1995: 334-5, emphasis in original).  Paterson himself takes a 
view on quality of life: glossing over his own assertions about the relative unimportance of 
these considerations, he nonetheless agrees that “[a] life endowed with more flourishing … is 
a fuller life than a life impaired in its ability to flourish” (Paterson 2003b: 11). He simply 
does not permit for these considerations to play any role in assessing the circumstances of an 
individual life, and the possible value or disvalue of suicide under those conditions.  
 
And so it remains that we need, as Peter Suber indicates, to “rethink the nature and value of 
life,” particularly as our moral and legal frameworks developed “during the long pre-
technological age in medicine when the cessation of breath and pulse always coincided with 
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the cessation of brain function and consciousness” (19969). As Suber points out, in 
contemporary medical contexts brain function and consciousness “no longer coincide” and 
we are left without a guide as to when “biological animation is life inviolate” and when it is 
not (1996).10 Against this backdrop, Suber argues, sanctity-of-life proponents paint their view 
“as the only one in the field for people who abhor murder” when the position “is not that 
comprehensive or exclusive in fact, and when articulated must give up some of the territory it 
occupies by virtue of vagueness and moral bullying” (1996). 
 
Clearly there are a great number of sanctity-of-life proponents who continue to assert their 
views with respect to the issue of suicide and its relative, euthanasia. As with any approach 
however, there are obviously deviations from the specific view offered by Paterson. 
Nonetheless, he is a fair representative of a secular, sanctity-of-life approach to the question 
of suicide and has explicated in detail his views across a number of concerns and in a variety 
of publications. For the purposes of this argument, then, we have focused on his views, to 
which we now pose a set of questions. It will be argued that the answers to these questions 
are less than satisfactory particularly as they do not provide us with a way to address the very 
real feelings we may have that a view that neglects the quality of a life, and the circumstance 
in which it is lived, is somehow lacking.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Suber’s	  essay	  is	  a	  dated,	  but	  un-­‐paginated	  manuscript,	  hence	  no	  page	  references	  are	  given	  for	  this	  piece.	  	  	  
10	  Suber’s	  essay	  speaks	  to	  the	  broadest	  form	  of	  sanctity-­‐of-­‐life	  arguments	  available:	  including	  that	  which	  may	  
pertain	  to	  “sagebrush,	  slugs,	  and	  Socrates”.	  Suber	  does,	  however,	  pose	  some	  interesting	  questions	  about	  how	  
and	  why	  we	  would	  cling	  to	  traditional	  sanctity-­‐of-­‐life	  arguments	  when	  the	  very	  definitions	  and	  characteristics	  
of	   human	   life	   itself	   appear	   to	   be	   shifting	   and	   changing	   as	   the	  medical	   advances	   continue.	   It	   is	   to	   this	   key	  
element	  of	  Suber’s	  essay	  that	  this	  essay	  refers:	  not	  all	  human	  life	  is	  equal	  simply	  because	  it	  seem	  to	  continue	  
to	  be	  some	  form	  of	  life,	  however	  biologically	  or	  medically	  defined.	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I will focus on three difficulties inherent in Paterson’s approach:11 first, is it acceptable to us 
to assert that all ‘life’ be equally valued, in and of itself, as if this is always more important in 
the most absolute terms than any other considerations (regardless of what these are) as to the 
quality, experience or value of the life lived? Secondly, even if all life has equal value, are 
there no circumstances in which a suicide could be said to be justified or morally 
permissible? Further to this, if there are circumstances in which suicide could be considered 
justified, would Paterson’s view permit for these? Finally, whose estimation of the sanctity-
of-life weighs, or weighs more? The person whose life it is, or the sanctity-of-life thinker?  
 
3.1.1. Can	  all	  life	  be	  equally	  valued?	  
	  
There is something inherently appealing about Paterson’s assertion that all life has value, no 
matter the circumstances. Clearly, for Paterson, there is no illness, nor indignity, nor loss of 
any faculty that undermines the quality or nature of a person’s life to the extent that it no 
longer has value. Paterson argues that we must value the life of the anencephalic infant and 
that of the person in a persistent vegetative state as much as we value the life of any other 
person (Paterson 2008: 190; 194), even when they are incapable of valuing their own lives. 
This thought, that all human life is valuable and that its value does not rely on it being ‘given’ 
value by another as it derives from an objective source outside of and independent from 
others, is appealing and at many levels feels right. However, the problem is that when it is 
applied to all instances in which ‘life’ is at issue, it is an exceedingly difficult position to 
maintain. It is also a position in which the lack of sensitivity to circumstance (whether of the 
person him/herself, or the lives of those around him/her or any other considerations) seems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   concerns	   with	   the	   value-­‐of-­‐life	   arguments	   that	   have	   been	   identified	   by	   Michael	  
Cholbi	   (2012)	   and	   Peter	   Suber	   (1996),	   for	   example.	  We	   focus	   on	   these	   three	   in	   this	   essay	   for	   their	   direct	  
relevance	  to	  suicide.	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counter-intuitive. To assert that every single instance of human life – no matter what form it 
takes - has and must have equal value such that suicide is never an option is surely a denial of 
the realities of the many and varied circumstances in which lives are lived.  
 
The source of our discomfort with such an approach is that it feels unreasonable to negate in 
their entirety the realities of questions pertaining to the kinds of lives humans have. Humans’ 
lives vary greatly and depend not only on internal factors, including belief systems, and 
psychologies, but also on external factors such as the variable distribution of resources that 
permit life to continue and, indeed, to flourish. These factors include water, food and other 
fundamental sources of sustenance in many places but may extend also to the obligations, 
needs and interests of others, whether family, community or state. 
 
At what cost can we demand that a life that contains very little ‘flourishing’ be sustained, for 
example? I am not certain that it is as simple as saying that the absolute value of any 
individual life is more than or at least as important as all the other concerns including those 
that pertain to the person him/herself, that person’s family, colleagues, community or state. 
Furthermore, where the means – whether economic, cultural, familial or personal and 
psychological – do not exist, it seems irresponsible to insist that all life, regardless of how 
utterly devoid of anything positive it may be, has an equal value and that that value equates to 
more than the value of any other consideration that we may wish to – or even have or be 
forced to - take into account. Arguably, it feels wrong to impose such a rigid interpretation 
onto others: you will live your life regardless of how flourishing or how torturous it because 
all life is valued.  
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The insistence on an absolute application of the principle of the sanctity of all life could have 
severely unfair impacts on the person whose life it is. Moreover, such an insistence could 
impact more unfairly on some more than others. Consider, for example, how an absolute 
prohibition on abortion results in the dismal imposition of the recognition of the sanctity of 
the life of the unborn child at the cost of the woman whose body happens to contain it, 
sometimes to the extent that the sanctity of her life is significantly undermined. Surely here 
we are ranking primary goods in the way that Paterson warns that we may not. I suspect that 
most of us agree that life is obviously something we treasure as humans; it is obviously a 
primary good. But it is not clear to me how we get from the view that life has this intrinsic 
value to the view proposed by Paterson: that any and all life, regardless of quality, comfort, 
meaning or resources, or the lack thereof, has exactly equivalent value in the absolute terms 
he dictates.  
 
Paterson is not unaware of these difficulties. For example, in arguing for the sanctity of all 
life, he objects (rightly I believe) to the application of the arbitrariness with which decisions 
are made about which new-borns with Downs Syndrome are worth saving and which are not 
(Paterson 2008: 192). But the same concerns about arbitrariness may result from Paterson’s 
own approach. If the sanctity of life is to be imposed on all regardless of the nature of the life 
in question, the resulting ‘life’ may be better or worse depending on a set of circumstances 
completely arbitrarily determined. So, for example, it is easier to countenance keeping a 
badly mentally and physically compromised child alive in a healthy, sterile and medically 
advanced context in which support, treatment and appropriate care are possible and potential 
risks and suffering are continuously mitigated. But the decision to enforce this same 
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requirement in a context where, for arbitrary reasons, such resources are not available may 
very well have a significantly negative impact on the child and its family and may result in 
more suffering and misery. The reason for the suffering is not the child’s state, nor is it that 
the child is ‘kept alive’; it is the fact that the manner in which the child is forced to live 
causes undue suffering and hardship as a result of such arbitrary determinants as access to 
medical technologies, care, food and so on.  
 
The closest Paterson appears to come to an answer to this concern is that: “[the] correct locus 
of evaluation to be focused upon in medical contexts … should be whether a proposed 
treatment for a patient is worthwhile or not, not whether a patient’s very life, in and of itself, 
is worthwhile or not” (2008: 118). But the question is moot when the life to be valued is to be 
found in circumstances that are such that this question cannot even be asked. Paterson’s 
response is that in situations where there is suffering, or pain or other burdens, the “only 
reasonable way to respond to those burdens is to do all we can to cure or diminish the pain 
and suffering of patients as best we can” (Paterson 2008: 119, emphasis in original). I believe 
this evades the very real difficulties relating to the limitations of circumstance. It is possible 
to imagine a person who acknowledges that all life has value, but that the value of life in her 
life is such that she is simply unable to give it expression. In Paterson’s view no 
acknowledgement is possible of the fact that the value of ‘life’ is for most of us expressed 
through ‘living’. If she were to commit suicide she would, for Paterson, always be acting 
impermissibly. 
 
In addition, Paterson glosses over questions of the imposition of sanctity-of-life principle in 
contexts where they are, for whatever reason, impracticable. By neglecting to delve into the 
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implications of this, he reveals a bias in his view that is discomfiting. Without making this 
discussion about the kinds of choices we need to make in situations where difficulties exist, 
or resources are scarce, I wish to point out, rather, that it is illogical to assume that there are 
no circumstances whatsoever which may impact on the impermissibility of ending a life. 
Despite Paterson’s assertion that “when faced with the reality of pluralism in contemporary 
society” we need to find an objective stance that is able to “provide us with the shared moral 
underpinnings for social life together” (2008b: 13), it seems that his view is so rigid that it is 
hardly able to cope with the exigencies of life, let alone with the very real debilitations so 
many people face on a daily basis. The stance he proposes just cannot be rigidly maintained 
and consequently is unable to address the variable nature of moral decision-making that 
circumstance demands of us.  
 
It remains unclear still whether it in fact is morally right to insist that someone - explicitly not 
me - live with intense pain, or in a state of deep ennui, suffering or deprivation. It is equally 
difficult to accept that it is morally wrong for me actively to prevent a person, or at least to 
place stumbling blocks in his / her way, to end his or her life.12 Finally, it seems problematic 
to gloss over the real cases in which circumstances or factors, whether internal or 
environmental, limit our ability in practical ways to value life at all. It seems problematic at 
least to impose on all the view that all life has equal value when the very imposition of this 
would in practice result in extremes of value and disvalue, including but not limited to those 
factors which have to do with geographic, economic or political accident. As Peter Suber 
observes, a sanctity-of-life argument does not make “triage unnecessary just because it makes 
choice impossible. When not all sanctified lives can be saved, then either we develop criteria 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	   In	   the	   final	   chapter	   of	   his	   book,	   Paterson	   argues	   that	   his	   natural	   law	   approach	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   suicide,	  
assisted	  suicide	  and	  euthanasia,	  provides	  a	  solid	  basis	  for	  the	  use	  of	  legal	  coercion	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  justifications	  
for	  placing	  limits	  on	  these)	  to	  enforce	  “some	  moral	  requirements”	  (Paterson	  2008:	  167).	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to save a good number, or we wring our hands in righteousness” (1996). Paterson’s 
exhortation to do the best we can is one such instance of hand-wringing.  In sum, we need a 
way in which to acknowledge the sanctity of all life as life, without also rigidly requiring that 
all life be equally valued regardless of type or circumstance.   
 
3.1.2. Is	  Paterson	  consistent?	  
	  
In the previous section, I looked at whether it is, in fact, possible to argue that all life, 
regardless of how it is experienced and by whom, can be equally valued. We looked at the 
kinds of constraints that may limit a person’s ability to enjoy the life given, or to live the life 
in a manner that at least reflects in basic terms its value as a life. Considering that most of us 
live in the context of a family, at the very least an insistence on the absolute value of a life 
over all other considerations may impact negatively on their lives too, for example. A further 
problem is that despite Paterson’s arguments presented in the section above, and 
notwithstanding his insistence all lives are of equal value, there are instances in which he 
himself makes exceptions to this view. It is not clear what the basis of these exceptions is, 
other than that they refer to something outside of the explicitly sanctity-of-life approach that 
he favours. It is clear then that Paterson does not always and everywhere prohibit killing, 
making his insistence on a strict prohibition of suicide even more confounding. Paterson 
permits for the withdrawal of lifesaving treatment in circumstances of suffering even though 
this may result directly in the death of the person. He acknowledges that the death of the 
person – thus a suicide in our definition – may be the intention of the patient in this context, 
and that the intention of such a withdrawal of treatment is what would give the suicide effect. 
In Paterson’s words, however, this does not amount to his condoning suicide (Paterson 
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2003a: 14). It is hard to see how this is the case, however, as the act fulfils his own definition 
of suicide.  
 
In a second case, Paterson quite logically rejects the death penalty as an appropriate response 
to crime (2008:96). There are few who would argue with this interpretation, whether from a 
sanctity-of-life approach, or a rights-based approach, so this is hardly surprising.  On the 
other hand, however, Paterson unquestioningly accepts the right to kill in self-defence, as: 
“the causal threat to self-preservation is such that respect for intrinsic human life does not 
demand from us that we must set absolutely set aside any resort to intentional killing” (2008: 
118). But this does not make sense. It is entirely possible, for example, that capital 
punishment for murderers could be justified through a reworking of the principle of self-
defence proffered by Paterson.  
 
As a third example, Paterson excludes from the category of suicide those self-inflicted or 
self-caused deaths where the intention is to force a particular outcome through the effecting 
of one’s own death. These instances, he argues, are cases of self-sacrifice and must be 
distinguished from suicide by their intention, even if they involve the suicide of a man to save 
his family suffering, as in the case of self-sacrifice, above. It is still not clear why Paterson 
thinks it acceptable to commit suicide to save one’s family from suffering, but never 
acceptable to do so for oneself, except where it involves the (passive) withdrawal of 
treatment. There is no real basis other than, in Paterson’s view, that in these cases the action 
of causing or bringing about his own death is distinct from the intended outcome of the death 
itself (Paterson 2008: 21; 198). 
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The above three instances of Paterson’s deviation from his own rule demonstrate the subtle 
and not so subtle inconsistencies in his application of the principle of the sanctity of all life. 
There are clearly cases in which Paterson thinks it is acceptable to kill (including one’s self) 
and instances in which it is not. But it is not always clear how he works out these differences. 
He does not account at all for them, and even in rendering them exceptions, does not attempt 
to define what, if anything, they have in common. It is inconsistent to assert that the value of 
life is immutable in all circumstances - except some - and then not to have access to an 
equally persuasive principle through which to define these exceptions.  
 
I believe that the source of this inconsistency in application derives from the fact that 
Paterson is not as insensitive to circumstance as he believes he is (as is shown by his attempts 
to define certain actions as ‘not suicides’). The exceptions outlined above demonstrate a clear 
acknowledgement of the circumstances that may make one deviate from the strictest 
application of the sanctity-of-life principle. For example, the suffering of the person for 
whom death may be accelerated without treatment; the distaste most of us would feel at 
having to terminate the life of someone else, no matter how distasteful that person’s crime 
may be; the threat to one’s own life, and the terrible suffering we may subject our family to if 
we were to insist on living: all of the exceptions relate to circumstances that determine to how 
lives are lived. However, Paterson’s insistence on the rigid approach to the question of the 
sanctity-of-all life (and to suicide in particular) makes it impossible for him to apply this as a 
rule. The only way to retain the rigidity of the principle is through making exceptions. By 
way of contrast, a circumstance-sensitive approach does not grapple with these variations and 
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is able to address the similarities and dissimilarities between cases and reach sensible, 
objective ethical determinations for each.  
 
3.1.3. Whose	  sanctity-­‐of-­‐life	  to	  whom?	  
	  
Paterson argues that we value the life of the anencephalic infant and that of the person in a 
persistent vegetative state as much as we value the life of any other person, even when they 
are incapable of valuing their own lives (2008: 190; 194). He rejects the view that we ought 
not to value these lives on the grounds that the persons themselves cannot do so and points 
out that the inability to function as we would normally expect of a person does not itself 
undermine the humanness of the individual in question and thus does not negate the value of 
that person’s life (2003b: 7). The fact that we are able to “identify with ‘human non-
persons,’” (such as those in debilitated states or those in whom personhood is “imperfectly 
manifested”) is precisely what “helps to make sense of the observation that people can and do 
seek to defend and promote human life without seeking an explanation for protecting or 
preserving human life in those who are profoundly damaged beyond an appeal to that good 
itself” (2003b: 7, emphasis in original). Our identification with these persons, continues 
Paterson, is not “merely a product of convention, sympathy, or compassion, but is ultimately 
ontological in nature” (Paterson 2003b: 8).  
 
For the sake of argument, assume Paterson is correct: we do not want to see others in that 
position as sub- or non-human, for to do so denies in some measure our sense of who we are, 
of how we are human. However, it is not clear on what basis we move from this assumption 
about “imperfectly manifested” humans to ‘perfectly manifested’ humans in full possession 
of reason and choice. In a way, it is easier to assert this observation about those incapable of 
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making their own decisions about the value of their own lives because they are incapable of 
doing so. We have recourse to the primary good of life, to which no one, after all, truly 
objects.  But I cannot see that this gives us sufficient grounds to say the same thing about 
persons who are capable of making the determination for themselves. Notwithstanding that 
the primary good is life, the grounds on which we are to assert the supremacy of this over the 
life as experienced or valued by the person living it are not evident. Human life needs a 
person for it to be valued in. And if that person is able to make decisions and judgments 
about the value of his her own life then that person is entitled to reach a determination about 
its value.  
 
For Paterson, the situation remains simple: “If a person is not a non-innocent, then he or she 
can never be intentionally killed. Respect for the primary good of human life is incompatible 
with all such actions” (2008:180).13 Elsewhere we have seen that Paterson includes suicide in 
the category of homicide (intentional killing) and it thus falls under this proscription. There 
are for Paterson no circumstances whatsoever, “neither consent of the patient, the condition 
of the patient, resource questions, nor the interests of third parties (or some combination 
thereof), [that] can justify intentional killing” (Paterson 2008: 181). Bearing in mind that 
Paterson’s definition does not permit for any exceptions, as those where the justifications for 
the death have already been excluded (for example, self-sacrifice to the needs of or protection 
of others), there are no instances ever in which a morally permissible suicide may take 
place.14  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Presumably	  by	  “non-­‐innocent”	  Paterson	  means	  someone	  who	  has	  not	  tried,	  for	  example,	  to	  take	  another’s	  
life	  thus	  necessitating	  the	  need	  to	  kill	  him	  /her.	  	  
14	  I	  leave	  aside	  all	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  the	  role	  of	  others	  in	  suicides	  for	  simplicity’s	  sake.	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So, for Paterson, the sanctity-of-life and its expression can never be differentiated from the 
expression of life itself for that person. All life, regardless of how minimally present, or 
minimally good, is equally valuable.  This is no less true for the person who does not see her 
own life as having value than it is for the person incapable of knowing that her life has value. 
All life, no matter its quality, has value and the value of the life to the person living it is 
completely outweighed by the value of that person’s life attributed to it by the sanctity-of-life 
doctrine.  I believe this kind of argument creates difficulties for us as, for example, we could 
then be obliged to insist that all living persons, regardless of their circumstances, are required 
to stay alive even in cases where extreme suffering for the person or his family and friends 
could result.  This would be no less true for situations in which life is deemed to be ‘only’ 
biologically present, as it is in cases where the sentient person is fully aware of his or her life 
and expressly wishes to terminate it. I do not see that this is a position that may be 
sustained.15 
 
Paterson’s response to this concern, to some extent encapsulated in his responses to the 
quality-of-life considerations he counters and which have been examined earlier, is somewhat 
convoluted. He asserts that there are simply no circumstances in which the value of a life can 
be viewed as so degraded that it ceases to be inherently valuable (2003a:14). But because it 
seems to be illogical to assume that there is no manner in which a poor quality of life 
undermines or degrades the value of a life at all, Paterson himself makes exceptions. So, he 
argues, in circumstances where great suffering is experienced, for example, and the person 
wishes to die, and the doctors treating the person withhold the treatment necessary to sustain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Of	  course,	  other	  questions	  may	  also	  be	  raised	  in	  connection	  to	  a	  sanctity-­‐of-­‐life	  approach	  such	  as	  Paterson’s.	  
If	  we	  were	  to	  insist	  that	  all	  living	  beings	  be	  kept	  alive,	  would	  this	  not	  impose	  on	  us	  some	  kind	  of	  obligation	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	  such	  life	  be	  provided,	  especially	  in	  instances	  where	  it	  is	  simply	  not	  possible	  for	  
the	  person	  to	  do	  it	  for	  himself?	  If	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  then	  on	  what	  basis	  do	  we	  insist	  that	  others	  live	  to	  satisfy	  
our	  principles?	  Although	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper,	  these	  are	  nonetheless	  interesting	  implications	  for	  a	  
fully-­‐realised	  sanctity-­‐of-­‐life	  principle.	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life thus effecting death, the withholding or withdrawing of treatment from a person is 
permissible. The fact that Paterson views this as “a principled decision to intentionally act for 
a good objective, the common good of patient, and the community generally” does not excuse 
the patient in this case from “their own wrongful actions” (Paterson 2003b: 14; 15). While 
this makes sense of the doctors’ ethical obligations and responsibility perhaps, the patient is 
never to be exonerated from his own death. For Paterson “anything, whether caused naturally 
or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the 
process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person” (Paterson 
2003b; 19, emphasis added), and there are consequently no circumstances in which a suicide 
is permissible.  
 
In sum, Paul Jewell notes that a belief in the sanctity-of-life remains “a powerful influence, a 
deeply held intuition” (2005:6), one that may, in fact, be instinctive. There can be no question 
that arguing that suicide may sometimes be morally permissible does not mean that one does 
not value life per se. There are unquestionably aspects of a sanctity-of-life view that have a 
key place in our determination of whether and when a suicide may be considered morally 
permissible, but when applied wholesale to the question of suicide across all varieties of 
circumstances and in the rigid, austere form given to it by Paterson, it is unable to perform 
some of the ethical differentiations we feel we need when it comes to the question of when it 
is morally permissible to end one’s own life.   
 
The great value of a sanctity-of-life approach is its focus on an appreciation of what suicide 
means in terms of its potential harm both to the person wishing for death and for those around 
her. Rights-based approaches, for example, take a more individual approach, focused as they 
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are on the rights of the person. Regardless of which approach we select, many would agree 
with Christopher Cowley that our first response on hearing of a suicide is feelings of horror 
or pity, or questions as to why (2006: 496). Nonetheless, and despite these initial feelings, we 
may not necessarily feel that every suicide is morally blameworthy, that every death is an 
evil. Sometimes we do feel relief for the other person, or for her family, and we need an 
ethical approach that permits for us to address the entire spectrum of suicides. I propose 
below that utilitarianism offers us such a circumstance-sensitive approach.  
 
3.2. UTILITARIANISM AND SUICIDE: A BETTER APPROACH? 
 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to addressing the question of whether suicide is ever morally 
permissible is that it is our sense that suicides are unique and that each one needs almost to be 
assessed individually in order to determine its moral status. So two people may have, for 
example, exactly the same dreadful life situation and they may wish equally to end their lives 
for the same set of reasons. However, one of them may have the means to change this and 
one may have no means whatsoever to do so. One may have dependants with no other means 
of support; the other may be free from dependants. Clearly, were both to act in exactly the 
same way, our intuitive judgment of their decision may differ. Thus the reasons for why 
someone wants to or has committed suicide may be very different, the impact on that 
person’s own life of these reasons may differ, the impact on the people she leaves behind 
may be variable, and the values and beliefs of the two individuals concerned may also be 
divergent. It is possible, then, that in moral terms we would reach two different decisions 
about two ostensibly similar suicides. In the same way as we often differentiate between 
killing as an act of aggression and killing as an act of self-defence, even though they are both 
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killing, we need a way in which to address our intuitive sense that not all suicides are of equal 
moral status.   
 
If we accept that there is something important about circumstances and the actions to which 
they lead, then it is fair also to say our sense of the moral permissibility of an act depends 
equally on aspects of the circumstances leading to the act, and the consequences or results of 
the act. We generally accept, for example, that killing is wrong. And yet as a society we 
accept that sometimes it is permissible to kill if, for example, by not killing, then one’s own 
life would be taken. In the same way we may feel instinctively that it is wrong for someone to 
be in the position of wanting to die, rather than of wanting to live. To address this we seem 
prepared to recognise that there are circumstances in which just such a desire may be not only 
be understandable but also morally permissible to act upon. To say that something is 
understandable in its context is not, however, a moral standpoint; it is simply descriptive of 
the fact that we have empathy for the situations of others. But surely it is important for our 
moral systems to be premised somehow on this empathic sense of our own and another’s 
realities? Surely for an ethical system to be of value, it needs not only to provide the rules, 
but also to be flexible enough to address the realities of the application of these rules in the 
contexts in which we live and decide how we will live. Also, as contexts change, an ethical 
system must address the social, economic, scientific and other developments that continue to 
affect our lives as humans, our consequent circumstances and resulting decisions.  
 
Assuming then that there is something appealing about circumstance-sensitive moral 
approaches, the sanctity-of-life approach such as that suggested by Paterson becomes 
increasingly difficult to sustain, no matter how much we may wish to do so. Craig Paterson is 
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insistent that the deontological, sanctity-of-life principle he supports is inviolate. Recognising 
the difficulties of such deontological absolutism in moral norms, he characterises his view as 
different to that of the deontologists who hold that “moral norms can never be absolute” 
(2008:132). In order to address this rigidity, he argues that for these theorists,16 “the 
underlying appeal of consequentialism is that an otherwise exceptionless negative moral 
norm, like the intentional killing of the innocent, can be overridden or trumped in at least 
some hard cases” (2008:132). He refers to this as the deontologists’ “safety-valve feature” 
(2008:132), the thresholds for the application of which are subject to debate and rely on “a 
critical mass of irregular bad consequences” which are significantly important enough to 
“jettison the bindingness of regular obligations” (2008: 132).  
 
I agree with Paterson’s conclusion that to use consequentialism to address the failings of 
deontological approaches leads to morally discordant results, including uncomfortable trade-
offs between the “weight of bad consequences” and the “wrongness of violating 
deontological obligations” (Paterson 2008: 108). As Paterson concludes, “[d]eontology and 
consequentialism have fundamentally different conceptions about the basic structure of moral 
thinking” (2008: 108). It is my argument that the fact that we sense that some suicides may 
just be more morally permissible than others means that the deontological norm that suicide 
is always wrong is inadequate. We need a more effective approach than that offered us by the 
sanctity-of-life view from which to assess whether suicide can ever be morally permissible. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Paterson	  lists	  these	  theorists	  as	  “Charles	  Fried,	  Thomas	  Nagel,	  Tom	  Beauchamp	  and	  James	  Childress,	  and	  
Robert	  Nozick”	  who	  “while	  their	  deontological	  systems	  differ	  from	  one	  another	  in	  many	  key	  respects,	  they	  all	  
ultimately	  agree	  that	  deontological	  approaches	  to	  ethical	  deliberation	  are	  concerned	  with	  regular	  boundary	  
setting	  (2008:	  131).”	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As indicated earlier, Paterson deals with those self-selected deaths he feels are not wrong as 
exclusions to the definition of suicide (2008). Given the rigidity of deontological moral 
systems, this is essential. In a consequentialist view, however, there is no need to exclude 
certain deaths from the definition of suicide in order to find them morally acceptable. For 
example, using Hill’s definition of suicide, which focuses on the relationship between the act 
of killing oneself and its goal, a suicide occurs when A performs an act “x if and only if A 
intends that he or she kill himself or herself by performing x (under the description ‘I kill 
myself')” (Hill 2011: 192). However, all suicides in this definition would be impermissible to 
Paterson.  
 
It is in a broadly consequentialist, utilitarian approach that I think we are able to find a better 
answer to the question of whether suicide may ever be morally permissible or not. In keeping 
with my sense that morality must be linked somehow to our sense of ourselves as humans 
able to connect with and understand each other and the contexts and circumstances in which 
we live, a utilitarian view is pre-eminently based in circumstance and outcomes. At this 
juncture, it is important to note that this is not an argument for utilitarianism in general, nor 
will I be attempting to justify its use in general terms by challenging the potential 
shortcomings and counter-arguments in any sustained way.17 The paper aims simply to 
counteract the presumptions of a sanctity-of-life view such as that proposed by Paterson by 
offering an alternative approach, one able to address the shortcomings of the rigidity of the 
sanctity-of-life view.  The issue of suicide, and its relationship to euthanasia, continues to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  One	  of	  the	  clearest	  concerns	  with	  a	  utilitarian	  approach	  to	  suicide	  could	  be,	  for	  example,	  that	  suicide	  move	  
from	  becoming	  a	  choice	  made	  by	  an	  individual	  in	  the	  context	  of	  her	  circumstances	  to	  something	  that	  is	  
imposed	  upon	  her	  by	  an	  external	  evaluation	  of	  these	  same	  circumstances.	  It	  would,	  for	  example,	  go	  against	  
most	  of	  our	  instincts	  to	  insist	  that	  those	  whom	  a	  society,	  family	  or	  community	  cannot	  or	  will	  not	  care	  for	  be	  
terminated	  to	  ensure	  the	  maximization	  of	  happiness	  for	  all.	  	  Secondly,	  I	  have	  kept	  the	  context	  of	  the	  utilitarian	  
evaluation	  personal,	  as	  to	  generalise	  from	  the	  individual	  to	  the	  state,	  for	  example,	  would	  be	  far	  too	  complex	  a	  
question	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  paper.	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  have	  ignored	  the	  social	  justice	  aspects	  of	  the	  utilitarian	  
approach	  completely.	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pose a challenge to us. But it seems that it ought not to be more difficult than other ethical 
questions. It is my sense that the question of suicide may lend itself more readily to utilitarian 
analysis than to sanctity-of-life considerations, in the same way, perhaps, as the competing 
statuses of woman and their unborn foetuses lend themselves more readily to rights-based 
paradigms.  
 
Broadly speaking, utilitarian views on suicide address the question of whether suicide is 
morally right or morally wrong by assessing the results or consequences of the act against 
other possible acts (for example, not killing oneself) with potentially different consequences 
possible in the circumstances.18 Judith Driver explains that utilitarian views suggest that the 
“rightness of an action” is determined only by a “consideration of the consequences 
generated” (2005: 34). Thus a suicide (the action) would result in a set of consequences 
which lead to a particular state of affairs. Likewise, not committing suicide would also lead to 
a particular set of (different) state of affairs. It is the respective values of these resulting states 
that are used to determine whether the consequence achieved the best state of affairs possible 
and also then whether the act was morally permissible or not. In a utilitarian view, nothing 
that is relevant, including the context, surrounding circumstances and the “intrinsic nature of 
the act” is excluded from the determination of the rightness of the act (Sinnott-Armstrong 
2011:3). Whether an act is right or wrong depends entirely on the “non-moral goodness of 
[the] relevant consequences” (Darwall 2003:27). Importantly, it is not the consequences 
themselves that are judged morally right or morally wrong. They are, rather, assessed against 
values held to be prior to and independent of morality (Darwall 2003:26-7).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Clearly	  utilitarian	  views	  (and	  there	  are	  many	  diverse	  forms	  of	  these)	  are	  consequentialist	  as	  opposed	  to	  
deontological.	  In	  places	  in	  this	  report	  the	  terms	  “consequentialist”	  and	  “utilitarian”	  are	  used	  somewhat	  
interchangeably,	  and	  in	  their	  broadest	  senses.	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We approach the question of whether suicide may ever be morally permissible from either an 
act-consequentialist or a rule-consequentialist viewpoint. In an act-consequentialist view, the 
rightness of an act is seen as dependent on the value of the consequences for that particular 
act compared to the value of other acts possible in the circumstances (Darwall 2003:27). In 
this view, we assess the permissibility of a suicide by asking whether the consequences of the 
act of suicide are more ‘good’ than the consequences of not committing suicide would be. 
The rightness of the act of suicide can thus be determined by whether the suicide would 
“most promote the good” (Driver 2005:40). In this view we could argue that a suicide that 
prevents extreme harm to oneself is permissible, for example, notwithstanding the generally 
assumed prohibition on self-killing.  
 
Like Paterson, who removes the religious arguments from his secular sanctity-of-life 
approach to the question of suicide, utilitarian views are secular. Rachels and Rachels explain 
that the principle of the utilitarian view is designed precisely to work outside of a set of 
abstract moral rules or references to a deity (Rachels & Rachels 2010: 98). Historically, the 
utilitarian principle of the maximisation of happiness was located in the context of social 
reform (Rachels & Rachels 2010: 98). In a utilitarian view, the benefits or harms of an act of 
suicide may be weighed against the benefits or harms of a continued life – there is no 
presumption of preference inherent in either (Rachels & Rachels 2010: 100-101).  
Considering that behind much of the contemporary engagement with the question of the 
permissibility of suicide is the need to reform the ways in which we view suicide in the 
context of increasing medical advances, a utilitarian view seems fitting. In broad terms, it is 
utilitarianism that will permit us to ask ‘is suicide ever morally permissible?’ while allowing 
us to focus in a more plausible, coherent manner on all the relevant considerations and issues 
including the preferences and rights of the would-be-suicide, as well as all those surrounding 
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him. We could, for example, consider the weight of the would-be suicide’s atheism against 
the weight of his friends’ religiosity. We could consider the pain the would-be suicide is 
suffering, against the loss his friends and colleagues may experience. We could certainly 
weigh the would-be suicide’s desire for death against the fact that he has elderly parents who 
rely on him financially and physically. And so on. A utilitarian view by nature includes all 
aspects of the outcomes of a situation as directly relevant to the judgment of its 
permissibility. It asks us to indicate what is and what is not relevant to the assessment of 
moral worthiness in the context of the maximisation principle. Given our sense that not all 
suicides are ethically equivalent, we can use a utilitarian view to address the morality of 
suicide in a way that is able to take balanced cognisance of the context.  
 
It is perhaps this appreciation of context and individual circumstance that Richard Brandt 
recognises in the broadly utilitarian approach he proposes to suicide. He looks in broad 
brushstrokes at the possibilities that are open to us in this paradigm, using the morally neutral 
definition he proposes. Brandt’s injunction to us to remain as neutral as possible in assessing 
the permissibility or impermissibility of a suicide means that we may be in a position to 
address the shortcomings of the kind of absolutist approach offered us by Paterson’s sanctity-
of-life view.  In his seminal 1975 article, “The Morality and Rationality of Suicide”, Brandt 
poses three questions he considers key to contemporary philosophy on suicide. These are: is 
suicide always “necessarily morally blameworthy” even when it occurs in circumstances in 
which it is “objectively morally wrong”? (Brandt 1992: 315); when is suicide “objectively 
morally right or wrong”? and, finally, “when is it rational from the point of view of an 
agent’s own welfare for him to commit suicide”? (Brandt 1992: 315). In Brandt’s view the 
last question is the most important. His article and the questions he poses in this piece have 
had and continue to have a significant impact on thinking about the morality of suicide, and 
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many contemporary writers continue to respond to his arguments.    
 
To reiterate the point made in the introduction to this section, above, Brandt states that it is 
“obviously” rational that a person with a painful terminal illness would want to commit 
suicide unless there are “social activities or responsibilities” more important to the patient 
than the pain (1992: 327). In Brandt’s view the “decision to commit suicide for reasons other 
than terminal illness may in certain circumstances be a rational one” (1992: 332) and one to 
which we may not take exception. Even if we disagree with Brandt’s views on suicide, his 
first question articulates the key instinct that what we feel about suicide in general may not 
always align to what we think of the permissibility of a particular suicide. In Brandt’s words, 
“to be morally blameworthy or sinful for an act is one thing, and for the act to be wrong is 
another” (1992: 316). This distinction is useful, for example, in instances such as determining 
the nature of an act and its moral permissibility. Thus it is wrong to kill another; but it is not 
blameworthy to do so when there is no alternative but to be killed oneself. The distinction 
drawn by some utilitarian thinkers, such as Brandt, between wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness is a useful one for us here, particularly given the nature of some of our 
responses to suicide and its permissibility.  It is worth teasing these strands out a little before 
we proceed. 
 
Brandt offers us several examples of objectively morally wrong suicides. First, consider a 
person who commits suicide because he believes that he is morally bound to do so to release 
his family from the burden of his terminal illness as an example of an objectively morally 
wrong suicide. The person does not want to commit suicide, but he does so because of his 
sense of duty to his family. Secondly, suppose a person commits suicide because he is 
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“temporarily of unsound mind” (1992: 317). Finally, Brandt offers the example of the person 
who commits suicide because she is temporarily not herself, perhaps “frightened or 
distraught, or in almost any highly emotional frame of mind” that renders a person not her 
usual self (1992: 317). In the three cases above, Brandt argues, we would not find that 
person’s suicide morally blameworthy even though in the instance it may have been 
objectively morally wrong for the person to have killed him or herself at that time.  
 
Brandt, applying a broadly rule-utilitarian approach, defines that which is morally unjustified 
as: 
prohibited by the set of moral rules the currency of which in the consciences of 
persons in his society a rational person would choose to support and encourage, 
as compared with any other set of rules or none at all (1992: 318). 
Moral blameworthiness, on the other hand, refers to the character of the actor which is “in 
some respect below standard” and whose acts are a reflection on this “defect of character” 
(Brandt 1992: 316). Thus Brandt picks up on a key issue articulated above, that our sense that 
not all suicides are equal may relate to our feeling that they are not all always equally morally 
impermissible. We may hesitate to render all suicides morally blameworthy, and seek rather 
to find ways to examine and weigh the relevant circumstances and outcomes. Brandt’s 
significance lies in his suggestion that a more nuanced approach to the question of whether 
suicide is morally permissible is possible. The questions go to the heart of our disquiet: if we 
do not always think every suicide morally impermissible, how are we able to account for 
that? 
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Thus far I have shown that a broadly utilitarian view is able to addresses the question of 
whether a specific suicide is morally permissible or not by answering the question of whether 
the suicide on balance ‘maximises utility’. If the answer to the assessment is yes, then the 
suicide would be morally permissible. If the answer is no, then it would not be permissible. 
Clearly this is a gross oversimplification of the enquiry, but in broad brushstrokes it renders 
the moral permissibility of suicide as a question that remains to be answered depending on 
the circumstances that pertain. We ought also to be able to derive some general guidelines (I 
hesitate to call them principles) as to what kinds of circumstances are more (or less) likely to 
render a suicide permissible or impermissible. What we do know is that a sound utilitarian 
argument on suicide could focus on a wide range of factors. It is worth, at this point, looking 
at an example of a utilitarian argument about suicide in action. 
 
In the words of Rachels and Rachels, for an act to be moral in a utilitarian view it must not 
merely produce the best possible result from a range of options, it must produce the result 
that expressly “oppose[s] suffering and promote[s] happiness” or achieves the “greatest 
balance of happiness over unhappiness” (2010: 98-99). In his masterful 1975 piece, “Active 
and Passive Euthanasia,” (in which active euthanasia is a clear example of the election to 
commit suicide), James Rachels deftly demonstrates how our assumptions about what is and 
is not moral may result in an outcome that creates significantly less happiness (and hence is 
less moral) taking into account all concerned. We look at elements of Rachels’ approach as a 
basis for an analogous discussion of the moral permissibility of suicide.  
 
Rachels focuses his arguments about the natures of active and passive euthanasia specifically 
on the view taken by the American Medical Association (AMA) doctrine which states that it 
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is permissible for a medical practitioner to allow a patient to die, but that it is impermissible 
for the doctor to “take any direct action designed to kill the patient” (Rachels 1975: 78). 
Active euthanasia (assisting the actor to commit suicide) is forbidden by law, whereas passive 
euthanasia (allowing the person to die) is not.19 Leaving aside the distinctions between the 
various kinds of euthanasia that would be relevant to a more detailed discussion of this issue, 
it is enough to differentiate between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ for the purposes of Rachels’ 
argument that the AMA view is misguided. The issue relating to the morality of the doctor 
who would be assisting the actor in the commission of suicide needs to be excluded from this 
paper. Rather, we focus on Rachels’ main arguments in support of his position that the guide 
to ethical conduct set out by the AMA forces a doctrine on doctors that may be morally 
indefensible (1975: 80). On what grounds does Rachels assert this view?  
 
What is instructive about Rachels’ argument is how he demonstrates that a proper assessment 
of the moral differences between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia requires us to fully 
appreciate and evaluate the state of affairs resulting from the consequences of both. Rachels 
shows, in this piece, that our presumptions about the differences between them, and 
particularly about which is the better approach, may change once we have examined the 
implications of the resulting state of affairs. To this end, for example, he shows how the 
commonly held assumption that ‘killing’ is worse than ‘letting die’ is not necessarily 
supportable. He shows that “the bare difference between killing and letting die does not, in 
itself, make a moral difference” (Rachels 1975: 79). It works like this: whether one kills 
someone or lets them die, the motive of both is to bring about their death. If this is true, then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Of	  course,	  if	  the	  focus	  in	  this	  paper	  was	  euthanasia	  and	  not	  the	  broader	  question	  of	  suicide,	  we	  would	  have	  
to	  distinguish	  ‘assisted	  suicide’	  from	  ‘voluntary	  euthanasia’.	  The	  distinction	  is,	  logically	  enough,	  based	  on	  
whose	  action	  is	  the	  last	  in	  the	  sequence	  of	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  death.	  Thus	  the	  action	  of	  administering	  a	  
lethal	  injection	  to	  someone	  desirous	  of	  death	  is	  ‘voluntary	  euthanasia’,	  whereas	  the	  self-­‐administered	  lethal	  
medication	  provided	  by	  a	  medical	  person	  would	  be	  ‘assisted	  suicide’.	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from a consequentialist view, killing and letting die are morally the same. However, and this 
is the salient point, the assumption that active euthanasia is morally ‘worse’ than passive 
euthanasia does not hold.  The reason that it does not hold lies in the value of the states of 
affairs that result from each of these actions. Thus, in killing a person to bring about his death 
because the person is in “terrible agony” (Rachels 1975: 78), the suffering is immediately 
terminated. However, the withdrawal of treatment from this person may cause him to take 
“longer to die, and so he may suffer more than he would if more direct action were taken and 
a lethal injection given” (Rachels 1975: 78). For this reason, the withdrawal of treatment – 
carried out on humane grounds – may ironically be less humane than the deliberate 
termination of his life would be. For our purposes, then, it is simply not possible to argue that 
it is always better to live than to die. Rachels’ argument demonstrates how such a 
consequentialist view permits for insight into the morality of our commonly held 
presumptions. In a related manner, Rachels asks also that we consider the idea that killing is 
somehow worse than letting die because the former involves action, while the latter simply 
requires inaction. As Rachels demonstrates, in this context of killing and letting die, both are 
actions subject to moral appraisal.  
 
The AMA approach is premised on the desire not to prolong agony. Obviously, this is a 
commendable intention and not one to which most people would object. What Rachels 
shows, however, is that the consequences of this apparently commendable doctrine may be 
diametrically opposed to its stated intent: passive euthanasia prolongs agony in ways that 
active euthanasia simply does not. Important also is Rachels’ discussion of arbitrariness. 
Bearing in mind Paterson’s dislike for arbitrariness in passive euthanasia, Rachels points out 
that the decision to cease the “employment of extraordinary means to prolong ...  life” (1975: 
78) may ultimately depend on reasons irrelevant to the need for euthanasia, and may thus be 
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morally unsupportable. Thus for Rachels the AMA doctrine is unsound (1975: 78).20 
 
The consequentialist lens applied to the active / passive euthanasia distinction, shows us how 
a commonly held assumption about the moral wrongness of an action may in fact be 
misplaced. The usual reason for not wanting to cause someone’s death is that causing 
someone’s death is evil. As we have seen, however, in the case of euthanasia, death may very 
well be more desirable than the suffering that precedes it. A medical team may, apparently 
ethically, act to cause more suffering by withholding treatment on the instruction of a patient 
to effect a suicide (passive euthanasia), but is not permitted to assist the same person in the 
same circumstances to achieve this end without suffering.  
 
In his argument about the difference between active and passive euthanasia, Rachels points us 
neatly to the key issue, which is not the fact of death, which will result regardless, but the 
consequences, the state of affairs which will pertain after the course of action is decided 
upon. He shows how it may be preferable to choose the approach that ameliorates suffering 
most efficiently and painlessly. The relevance of Rachels’ argument for the question in this 
paper lies in the distinction drawn between active and passive euthanasia, and its basis in 
their respective consequences.21 If active voluntary euthanasia is akin to ‘suicide’ in that they 
both involve the termination of a person’s life at her rational request, and assistance is only 
required because the person is unable to undertake the performance of the suicide herself, 
then passive euthanasia is no less ‘passive suicide’. In a consequentialist view, the difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  For	  interest’s	  sake,	  this	  approach	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  action	  and	  inaction	  applies	  equally	  to	  sanctity-­‐
of-­‐life	  approaches,	  although	  clearly	  not	  for	  consequentialist	  reasons.	  In	  a	  deontological	  viewpoint,	  such	  as	  that	  
put	  forward	  by	  Paterson,	  allowing	  a	  new-­‐born	  to	  die	  from	  its	  congenital	  birth	  defects	  (passive	  euthanasia)	  is	  as	  
much	  a	  killing	  as	  injecting	  the	  child	  the	  same	  as	  “non-­‐voluntary	  euthanasia,	  for	  the	  omission	  to	  treat	  [the	  child	  
surgically]	  was	  intentionally	  taken	  with	  a	  view	  to	  hastening	  the	  death	  of	  the	  infant”	  (Paterson	  2008:	  192).	  	  
21	  Clearly,	  the	  AMA	  was	  not	  examining	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  two	  actions	  from	  a	  utilitarian	  approach,	  
regardless	  of	  the	  reliance	  on	  consequence	  in	  the	  distinction	  drawn	  between	  active	  and	  passive	  euthanasia.	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between the two suicides is simply the means by which the life is terminated, not the nature 
of the death by suicide itself and yet there are different moral proscriptions relating to each. 
The suicide (or killing) at the heart of the act of active euthanasia is prohibited, while the 
‘passive suicide’ (euthanasia through the withdrawal of treatment) is not prohibited. This 
distinction suggests that those who have accepted that passive euthanasia is necessary in 
some instances have actually accepted the permissibility of ‘passive suicide’ on 
consequentialist grounds, whether or not this is acknowledged.22  
 
Although the argument presented by Rachels does not directly speak to the question of 
suicide as at the heart of the permissibility of euthanasia, it nonetheless provides us with 
useful insights into how a utilitarian argument may move us beyond commonly accepted 
moral standpoints on issues and force us to interrogate our assumptions about these. Consider 
the now famous case of Diane Pretty, and the related question of Ms B, discussed by Peter 
Singer after the court found in Ms B’s case (Singer 2002). Both women were “paralysed, 
competent adults” (Singer 2002); both wished to die. Ms B requested the courts to approve 
the withdrawal of her treatment (she was on a ventilator) whereby her life would end; Diane 
Pretty needed someone to help her to commit suicide. In the case of Ms B, permission was 
granted; in the case of Diane Pretty, however, she died the death she so actively tried to 
avoid. As Singer indicates, the decisions would not have surprised the legal mind; they were 
consistent with the legal principle that a competent adult always retains the right to refuse 
treatment, in this case, even when the doctors do not wish to cease treating her (Singer 2002: 
234). It was the application of this legal principle that meant that Ms B was permitted to bring 
about her own death. On the other hand, however, Diane Pretty was refused her request 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  still	  some	  who	  could	  argue	  for	  the	  exclusion	  of	  instances	  such	  as	  these	  from	  suicide,	  as	  
demonstrated	  in	  the	  discussion	  about	  definitions	  of	  suicide,	  but	  we	  leave	  these	  considerations	  aside	  for	  the	  
moment	  so	  as	  to	  not	  impede	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  argument	  here.	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because laws preventing us from assisting others to die are in place and were upheld. As 
Singer points out, therefore, although there is no legal inconsistency (and this is worth 
quoting in full),  
we have arrived at the absurd situation where a paralysed woman can choose to 
die when she wants if her condition means that she needs some form of medical 
treatment to survive; whereas another paralysed woman cannot choose to die 
when or in the manner she wants because there is no medical treatment keeping 
her alive in such a way that, if it were withdrawn, she would have a humane and 
dignified death (Singer 2002: 234).  
For Singer, although the two cases are ‘essentially similar … these similarities are, from an 
ethical perspective, more significant than the differences between them” (2002:235). It is 
these kinds of absurdities that utilitarianism is able to avoid.  
 
Thus the kinds of consequentialist considerations that may be at the heart of the desire to 
make exceptions to the permissibility of certain types of suicide is directly relevant to the 
argument presented here. A focus on the nature of the consequences of an action or the 
application of a rule allows us to understand the impact of the commonly held moral 
preconceptions we may hold. Using such an approach, what can we assert about whether 
suicide may ever be considered morally permissible? It is possible that some circumstances 
may not be more preferable than the circumstance of death. Perhaps we do think that death is 
not always the worst outcome, which is why we consider passive euthanasia morally 
permissible. More broadly, though, how could the different kinds of circumstances be used to 
assess the moral permissibility of suicide across a variety of contexts? We examine a few of 
these scenarios below.  
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Consider a man, X, who has been diagnosed with an incurable illness. The disease causes him 
no pain or discomfort now, and he is not presently in physical distress. He lives a comfortable 
existence, surrounded by his family and friends. None of his family members are his 
dependants. He wishes to end his life in this happy state. He is not religious, and sees no 
impediments to his ending his own life. He has decided that he does not want to wait for the 
disease to take effect and for the symptoms to begin to impact on him negatively. Imagine 
that this disease is such that should the symptoms take effect, the man will lack the physical 
capacity to commit suicide but not the mental awareness of what ails him. He will thus be 
aware of his surroundings, will be able to see and hear but not speak or move. This inevitable 
outcome concerns him terribly. He does not wish to reach the stage in the illness where he 
will be forced to endure what he sees as insufferable entrapment until eventually he wastes 
away and dies. He will also have to watch his family and friends endure the strain of having 
to care for him. His friends and family are in accord with his feelings and although they will 
grieve his death, they will experience no additional negative consequences relating expressly 
to his earlier, rather than later death. Like him, they will be spared witnessing the suffering he 
inevitably faces, and will be spared the futility of trying to ameliorate this. After intense 
consultation with his doctors, family and friends, he decides to die a peaceful, self-inflicted 
death at home and in comfort. 
 
In an act-utilitarian framework, if the resulting state brought about by the consequences of 
X’s suicide are better than those of X’s continuing to live, then the suicide ought to be judged 
morally permissible. Using the above example, the consequences of the suicide are that the 
man’s life ends, there is significant grief on the part of his family and friends, but there is 
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equally no suffering of any sort for X. The memories of X are left intact and are (mostly) 
positive for those left behind. We can be satisfied that X has not reached his decision lightly, 
nor with undue haste (given due respect to the expected timelines of the disease). We are 
satisfied that he has sought ways in which to live, rather than to die as a result of the disease 
and that these are not available. We would expect him to ensure that any and all obligations 
to others that may be resolved, be resolved, and that provision is made for the satisfactory 
settlement of his affairs prior to his death. Were he not to kill himself he would have to 
endure a situation he views as torturous for himself and others, and which the others also 
view as torturous.  
 
The consequences of choosing death are preferable to those of the alternative: to live until the 
disease takes its natural course. To continue to live means the slow and miserable demise X’s 
doctors predict and he dreads. In that future, X believes he will suffer, those around him will 
also suffer; they will endure him suffering, and he their suffering. Death and grief would 
result also, although eventually after an undefined period of time. The memories of X would 
be dominated by the pain and suffering he has been through, at least for some time. For X and 
his friends and family, the state of affairs resulting from the consequence of X’s suicide are 
preferable to those that would pertain were he to continue to live until the illness takes effect 
and causes his death. In the case of X, his suicide is morally permissible. 
 
Let us now consider a case in which the alternative to death is not a prolonged and agonising 
illness. Consider the case of A. She is a mature woman, in possession of both her health and 
all her faculties. Her parents have died, she has no siblings with whom she is in contact, and 
she has achieved many, if not all of the goals she set for herself as a young person. She is not 
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strongly motivated by relationships with people, and has no lover or friends to whom she 
feels a particularly strong attachment, or they to her. She lives an averagely fulfilled life, with 
the occasional social outing, and is a pleasant and agreeable companion in a social setting. 
She performs satisfactorily at work, and leads a team of people which, due to its nature, 
experiences a constant and regular turnover of new, young staff. A is not depressed, she is not 
lonely and she is not sad. She feels no lack in her life, and is comfortably satisfied that she 
has had as much of it as she would like to experience. 
 
However, she is hugely discomfited by the thought of a future in which, as an old person, she 
is cared for by strangers; surrounded by people to whom she feels no connection. She has no 
children, nieces, nephews, or any other person on whom she could call should the need arise. 
She does not fear death, nor does she feel or fear loneliness; she simply does not see why she 
ought to want to live for however many years she has left in such a state. She decides that 
what she would like is a suitably comfortable end to her comfortable life. She arranges for a 
trip to a destination she has always wanted to visit, and obtains the medication she will need 
to end her life without pain, by falling into a deep sleep. She places the remainder of her 
estate in a trust with the requisite papers leaving her estate to her preferred charity lodged 
with her attorney.  
 
Her attorney, now apprised of the situation, wishes to understand her decision.23 They have 
known one another for many years, and he is aware of the circumstances of her life. He 
would not miss her if she were no longer part of his life, just as she would not miss him. He 
would not mourn her death. On this they agree. He wonders, aloud, whether her decision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	   Let	  us	  assume	  no	  attempt	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  attorney	   to	  change	  her	  mind,	  nor	   to	   ‘report’	  or	  prevent	  her	  
from	  enacting	  her	  decision.	  This	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  story	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  argument.	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would change if, for example, a whirlwind romance were around the corner, or a sudden 
financial windfall were to come her way. Her response is simply that she can no more count 
on this happening than she can count on it not happening, and so such thoughts in no way 
impact on her choice. He then asks her whether she has considered that her choice is selfish. 
She replies that it is indeed selfish, and that that in itself makes no difference to the nature of 
her current or possible future situation, as she has no dependants or indeed anyone to feel the 
impact of her selfishness. Selfishness, she replies, is only ‘bad’ if it negatively impacts on 
someone on whom it ought not to do so. In fact, she believes that while her act is selfish (it 
serves her own interests), it may be viewed as unselfishness in that the charity and its 
recipients benefit from her estate. In this instance, the consequences of her death lead to a 
state of affairs better than the current state of affairs for the charity to which she has left her 
money. It is arguably permissible for A to commit suicide.  
 
What types of consequences could affect the moral permissibility of her suicide? I suspect 
that there may be less discomfort with X’s reason than with A’s in the examples above. We 
may find X’s wish for suicide more acceptable than A’s because X’s future, were he to live, 
is sure to hold suffering and pain for him and those around him. A’s, on the other hand, 
seems to hold little more than that it is boring. Bearing in mind the discussion on the Rachels 
piece, above, we need not focus on the deaths of either A or X in this analysis. Rather, we 
ought to focus the kind of living that takes place up to the point at which death happens 
‘naturally’. We can understand more easily that the suffering in X’s future would be 
intolerable. We can see that it would be worse for X and his family than the death through 
suicide he wishes to choose. In the same way as Rachels shows that passive euthanasia may 
have worse consequences than active euthanasia given the state of affairs which results from 
the action or inaction, it is not as difficult for us to understand X’s position as it is, perhaps, 
54	  
	  
for us to understand A’s. The fact that X’s reasons may be more readily understood, however, 
does not necessarily mean that they are more moral. Given the factors outlined above, and all 
things considered, both deaths result in an overall better state of affairs, thus arguably both 
suicides are morally permissible.  
 
It is clear that our views on death are often conflicting. It seems to natural to want to avoid 
death and to want to avert the death of others. As Cowley (2006) points out, we do respond 
with shock to the news of a suicide and Western society on the whole continues to find 
suicide repugnant. Notwithstanding this, death is not always necessarily seen as the worst 
possible outcome of a set of circumstances and we do not always avoid it, at least not in the 
form of passive euthanasia, as the discussion on Rachels (1975) and Singer (2002) has 
shown. If our usual reasons for fearing death as the ultimate evil are absent, and if on balance 
to continue to live is not better than to die, then there is no reason to view suicide in these 
instances as morally impermissible. This is clearly not a revelation. It is, however, a far cry 
from a position that holds that that all suicides for whatever reason or circumstances are 
wrong. 
 
As is alluded to above, the types of circumstances in which people find themselves may not 
be sufficient to override the moral impermissibility of suicide. Thus, for example, although 
we may, on the basis of suffering (or potentially another kind of exception), view a certain 
suicide as permissible, these same circumstances alone are not necessarily sufficient for 
moral permissibility. Let us amend the circumstances such that the conclusion reached above 
does not pertain.  
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A man, call him Y, has been diagnosed with the same incurable illness as X. All the 
circumstances pertaining to X pertain to Y, with a crucial difference. Unlike in X’s case, Y 
has a partner and three young dependants. His partner is very ill, and her illness is already 
manifest physically. She is consequently weak and unable to work. It seems that she may 
succumb to the illness soon. Y, however, wishes to end his life now. Like X, he is not 
religious, and sees no reason to not end his own life now. He is also sure that in this way he 
will spare himself the loss of his partner. Although he does not know how long it will take for 
him to be affected by his illness, it is clear that Y will outlive his partner, disease 
notwithstanding. Y’s family and friends have outlined in detail for him how his partner will 
battle with looking after herself and the children, and that without his continuing income the 
financial burden for the children will fall to those who survive him. Y’s children have a 
legitimate interest in their father staying alive as long as he can, as they will be without a 
mother in the near future. They will need all the kinds of support that a parent can give in the 
context of the loss of another parent. They will also need their father to make the necessary 
arrangements for their futures to ensure, as far as possible, that their schooling and other 
needs are seen to. Thus notwithstanding Y’s desire to end his life without suffering (as in the 
case of X), the fact is that the circumstances of his life, and the dire consequences of his early 
death, would render his wishes untenable for his family and friends.  
 
It follows that this is a different situation to that of X. There can be no question that the 
consequences of Y’s suicide would be far worse, and for many more people, than in the case 
of either X’s or A’s suicides. To clarify this a little: the consequences of Y’s suicide for Y are 
preferable to the consequences of his continuing to live. He may not want to stay alive to 
make plans for his children, to suffer the death of his life partner, and to endure the illness 
that is certainly in his future. So ending his life would prevent his future suffering but would, 
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significantly, initiate and aggravate the suffering of his partner and his children. Although the 
consequences of Y’s death are better for Y, they are unquestionably worse for Y’s partner, 
children, family and friends. The only way for their circumstances to be better is for Y to live. 
Thus if Y were dead, the resulting state of affairs, would be far worse on the whole than if Y 
were not dead. In this case, and no matter how harsh, it is clear that Y’s actions are not to be 
condoned and that his suicide is morally impermissible. By way of contrast, and 
notwithstanding A’s lack of recognisable suffering, the consequences of A’s suicide do not 
impact negatively on others, do not create evil circumstances, and do not undermine the 
future of any other persons, Rather, her suicide will, through the act of her donation, improve 
the overall state of affairs. Thus her suicide is permissible. 
 
In a utilitarian framework, it is the circumstances that guide the assessment.  Thus in the case 
of X, where he and his family and friends are in agreement as to what should happen, there is 
little controversy to address. Likewise, in the case of Y, it is fairly certain that we would all 
agree that he has an obligation not to commit suicide.24 However, let’s assume a slightly 
different scenario for X by giving him a spouse, Mrs X, who is absolutely adamant that X 
ought not to commit suicide at all, for any reason whatsoever. Not only does Mrs X strongly 
oppose her partner committing suicide, she expresses this vociferously. It is clear that in very 
real terms the best outcome overall is still that X commits suicide. But if he does, he will be 
betraying his relationship with Mrs X and acting in direct contradiction to her views. She will 
be devastated. What is the utilitarian solution to this problem? It is possible, for example, to 
argue that Mrs X has a right	  against X that he not commit suicide; an obligation he is bound 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  This	  would	  be	  an	  interesting	  case	  to	  examine	  from	  a	  rights-­‐based	  perspective.	  If,	  as	  some	  libertarians	  would	  
argue,	  Mr	  Y	  ‘owns’	  himself,	  and	  if	  that	  ownership	  is	  overriding,	  how	  could	  we	  make	  an	  argument	  that	  it	  is	  
wrong	  for	  a	  person	  in	  this	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  to	  commit	  suicide?	  We	  would	  need	  to	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  that	  the	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  of	  Mr	  Y	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be	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  by	  his	  obligations	  towards	  others	  such	  that	  his	  weighed	  more	  than	  his.	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to honour. This right may derive from, for example, the nature of the vows they made to one 
another when they married. Or, perhaps, it need not be that specific, it may just be that we 
suppose that a spouse has a general right to have a say in the decisions about what is done to 
and by the person to whom she is married. How then do we, in a utilitarian framework, 
address this apparent imbalance? 
 
The fact is that Mrs X’s feelings are neither irrelevant, nor weightless; they are simply not 
sufficient to override the fact that X will experience overwhelmingly negative outcomes were 
he to stay alive. Balanced against the suffering that Mrs X would experience (and 
notwithstanding her commitment to his staying alive), it is nonetheless morally permissible 
for X to commit suicide. This assessment would be true even if a different framework were to 
be applied to that of utilitarianism, for example, a rights-based argument. In this approach, 
X’s obligations to Mrs X would weigh against his rights not to suffer unduly and 
unnecessarily). X may not be forced to suffer so that his wife’s wishes, which are not 
overriding, can be met.  
 
Why then would we not adopt a utilitarian approach to the question of suicide? In a utilitarian 
approach we have the ability to balance competing interests at play in the different situations, 
even where (perhaps especially where) they appear alike. As has been shown by the examples 
above, there is nothing that is of itself irrelevant to a utilitarian consideration of whether a 
suicide is or is not permissible. Even in instances - such as those of X and Y - where the 
situation appears the same, or in the case of A where we would at first blush refute the 
permissibility, the focus on the state of affairs that results from the action taken allows us to 
consider all the relevant factors. These may include the impact of the suicide on all affected 
parties, the specific consequences for the person and for his or her family, the religious views 
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of the person and his or her family, the kinds of resources and support mechanisms accessible 
to the family, the person’s state of health, the family’s financial need, the needs of 
dependants, and so on. A utilitarian approach is by its very nature sensitive to the 
circumstances that pertain in a situation such that the overall result is what is best for the 
greatest number of people. As Peter Singer points out, “the consequences of an action vary 
according to the circumstances in which it is performed,” and a utilitarian view “can never be 
accused of a lack of realism or of a rigid adherence to ideals in defiance of practical 
experience” (2011:3). Such outcomes are prevented in a utilitarian view precisely because 
such a view is directly rooted in the circumstances in which a decision is being made, as has 
been demonstrated above. Given that whichever approach we apply has to address the 
complicated nature of suicide, it is argued that it is a utilitarian view that has the inherent 
ability to do so, founded as it is in the assessment of the ‘maximisation of happiness’ of all 
consequences and outcomes of actions, and their relative moral permissibility. In Peter 
Singer’s words, “ethics is not an ideal system that is all noble in theory but no good in 
practice” (2011:2).  
 
Brandt demonstrates that in order to address the kinds of deaths that are ‘suicide’ but that 
may serve a ‘greater’ purpose, several writers have resorted to defining these out of the 
category of ‘suicide’ and into another category such as sacrifice, beneficence and so on. From 
a utilitarian viewpoint, such definitional gymnastics are not necessary. The utilitarian 
argument allows us the flexibility needed to answer the question of when suicide may be 
morally permissible, as well as to deal with instances in which we feel it may not be. It is 
possible in a utilitarian view to weight the value of a life over lives, to weight the value of an 
action against its consequences, and to decide as a result of this, and regardless of the sadness 
and the horror of the death, that a person who committed suicide did the right thing. As 
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Singer indicates with lying, sometimes an action is morally permissible and sometimes it is 
not, even when it is the same action. Thus in general lying is wrong and to be censured. But 
to say it is always and everywhere wrong to lie is nonsensical: “it may normally be wrong to 
lie, but if you were living in Nazi Germany and the Gestapo came to your door looking for 
Jews, it would surely be right to deny the existence of the Jewish family hiding in your attic” 
(Singer 2011:2). The “act-utilitarian judges the ethics of each act independently” (Singer 
2003: 527).  
 
If, as seems to be our intuition, there are conditions under which we would consider suicide 
morally justifiable, utilitarianism permits for us to assess each situation and reach some 
general principles. Notwithstanding the fact that there may be difficulties involved in making 
a utilitarian assessment of suicide, these challenges are common to all approaches. The 
question of the moral permissibility of suicide is complex and difficult. Given the variety of 
social and economic contexts in which we live today and the variations between these, it 
seems sensible to adopt an approach able to address a variety of cultural, economic and social 
variations. The maximisation of utility principle allows us to decide on the permissibility of 
suicide neutrally, but within relevant contextual and circumstantial considerations.  
 4. CONCLUSION	  
 
In this paper, I have argued that a utilitarian approach to suicide permits us to reach a finding 
as to its moral permissibility that is circumstance-sensitive. Circumstance sensitivity means 
that we will be able to address the many and varied ways in which our medical and other 
contexts impact on our understandings of life and death. I note that in contemporary western 
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societies, suicide continues to be associated with wrongfulness. I have shown that it is 
possible, using a broadly utilitarian framework, to argue that suicide is morally permissible in 
certain instances, and not only in those situations one would ordinarily associate with 
euthanasia of one sort or another. 
 
In order to argue this, I first examined a broadly sanctity of life approach, represented by 
Craig Paterson. I demonstrated that the application of a sanctity-of-life approach is too rigid 
for our purposes, and leads to harshness and absolutism in our moral decision-making. On the 
other hand, a utilitarian approach, despite its shortcomings and challenges, enables us to 
address at least some of our intuitions regarding suicide, and arrive at answer moral 
judgments in line with our desire for a more flexible view.  
 
Paterson argues that killing is wrong because all human life is always valuable. The most 
primary good is life, which is immutable and objective. As human beings, we seek the good 
and avoid evil. No matter what we may think of a particular suicide, for Paterson, suicide is 
always morally impermissible as death really is “the objective evil for us” (Paterson 2003b: 
19). Not only is suicide always wrong, but also assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia are 
instances of homicide and thus subject to the standard prohibition on intentional killing 
(Paterson 2008: 115). No suicide can therefore be justified on the unreasonable grounds that 
it may be better to be dead (Paterson 2008: 115-116).  
 
Importantly, however, Paterson himself finds it difficult to apply his principle of the sanctity-
of-life equally to all instances. Thus he condones passive euthanasia where it is “licit to 
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withhold or withdraw […] treatment” (Paterson 2003b: 13). And yet, he overtly rejects all 
considerations based on the quality of a person’s life (2003b: 5). I hope to have shown that 
Paterson’s dismissal of all quality of life considerations is unsatisfactory. I indicated a 
number of weaknesses with respect to Paterson’s argument that relate to how and whether we 
may assert that all life is equally valued, whether there are no circumstances whatsoever in 
which a suicide may be morally permissible. Given that Paterson himself wishes to permit the 
withdrawal of treatment, a form of suicide, these are key questions. Finally, I looked at the 
question of whether it can be said that the view of the person who places no value on her own 
life is less important than the sanctity-of-life thinker’s view of her life. The inflexibility of 
Paterson’s approach is difficult to apply across all situations, and may result in a keen lack of 
understanding of the real life circumstances of many. Furthermore, the consequences of the 
imposition of this rigid a view on others may be equally subject to moral censure.  
 
In response to the fact that we may feel that suicides are unique, and that we would like to be 
able to respond to them as such, I turned to utilitarianism. Given that circumstances and the 
actions to which they lead do have relevance to the assessment of moral permissibility in this 
view, I examined a few ways in which the approach could be adjusted to provide ore a more 
circumstance-sensitive approach to the moral permissibility of suicide.  
 
Utilitarian views on suicide ask whether a suicide is permissible or impermissible or by 
conducting an appraisal of the results or consequences of the suicide against all possible other 
possible actions (for example, continuing to live). Each of these actions leads to a different 
state of affairs, which are, in turn, assessed. The rightness of a suicide will be determined by 
whether it “most promote[s] the good” (Driver 2005:40), and may be weighed against the 
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consequences of a continued life (Rachels & Rachels 2010: 100-101). As Brandt (1992) 
points out, we may not find all suicides morally reprehensible, and a nuanced approach to the 
question of whether suicide is morally permissible is possible, by answering the question of 
whether the suicide on balance ‘maximises utility’.  
 
Thus the kinds of consequentialist considerations that may be at the heart of the desire to 
make exceptions to the permissibility of certain types of suicide is directly relevant to the 
argument presented here. A focus on the nature of the consequences of an action or the 
application of a rule allows us to understand the impact of the commonly held moral 
preconceptions we may hold. Using such an approach, what can we assert about whether 
suicide may ever be considered morally permissible? It is possible that some circumstances 
may not be more preferable than the circumstance of death. Clearly, it is this belief that is at 
the core of the common acceptance of passive euthanasia.  
 
In the discussion of the cases of X, Y and A, the varying kinds of circumstances that may be 
relevant to a finding of moral permissibility or impermissibility are suggested. The utilitarian 
sensitivity to circumstance means that it “can never be accused of a lack of realism or of a 
rigid adherence to ideals in defiance of practical experience” (Singer 2011:3).  
 
Nonetheless, it seems to me that a utilitarian approach is best suited to addressing our 
concerns about the rights and obligations of all involved, our apparent instinctive dislike of 
suicide (whether intuitive, social, cultural or religious in origin), and the consequentialist 
considerations that may play a role. We can do all of this while still retaining an account of 
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suicide that keeps open the question of permissibility based on the context of the act. While it 
may be said that sometimes adopting a utilitarian approach means that in order to maximize 
the good and minimise the bad we have to choose between two evils, it seems better to 
choose the lesser evil than to make no choice at all. It is hoped that this paper has 
demonstrated that we can still feel strongly that life has value and know that suicide may, in 
some instances, be morally permissible. To appreciate the sanctity of life does not require us 
to value all kinds of life in every circumstance, disregarding all constraints. In a utilitarian 
paradigm, we are able to carry these considerations into our assessment of each of life’s 
contexts, enabling us to decide whether suicide is permissible or not. 
 
 
- 0 -   
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